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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
On September 6, 1524, Desiderius Erasmus wrote a letter
to his "distinguished friend and patron, Henry VIII, the
King of England.'" He wrote, "The die is cast. The little
book on free-will has seen the light of day."* His small
book which had been published five days earlier at Basel was
De Libero Arbitrio. He had written this book to disas
sociated himself from "Martin Luther, whose revolutionary
views and fiery manner of expressing them in print were
setting all Christendom by the ears.'" This book developed
into a controversy between Erasmus and Martin Luther. In
response, a year later Luther wrote De Servo Arbitrio ( Bond
age of the Will) .
^ James I. Packer, "Luther Against Erasmus." Concordia
Theological Monthly 37 (April, 1966): 207.
* Ibid.
' Ibid.
4Statement of the Problem
The controversy regarding free will dates back to the
fourth century with Augustine versus Pelagius. The debate
continued through the centuries. The positions of Erasmus
and Luther have been considered as the Renaissance versus
the Reformation. Gordon Rupp advises to avoid this "over-
simplication which would affix"* these labels.
It is the purpose of this thesis (1) to trace the his
torical events which led to this controversy; (2) to analyze
De Libero Arbitrio and De Servo Arbitrio and the method of
debate; (3) survey reactions to Erasmus and Luther; and
(4) determine the theological implications of the debate.
The basic question which arose in the debate: Does
salvation depend on grace, and can we obtain grace by our
own deeds? There are many issues which arise such as the
authority of Scripture and its interpretation. In analyzing
De Libero Arbitrio and De Servo Arbitrio^ there are differ
ing views of God, man, sin, and salvation.
Both Erasmus and Luther were highly respected and each
reformers in their own way- Erasmus hated controversy while
Luther seemed to thrive on it. This leads to other ques
tions such as: Should controversy be avoided? Are there
issues, about which Christians should not be silent? If so,
then how should Christians disagree?
* Gordon Rupp, The Righteousness of God^ (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1953), 259.
5The General Method of Procedure
The general method of procedure of this thesis has been
an investigation of the original sources, De Libero Arbitrio
and De Servo Arbitrio and the many books and articles avail
able on the subject. These two works are found in Volume
XVII of The Library of Christian Classics
1983 was the five-hundredth anniversary of Martin
Luther's birth. This resulted in another look at this his
torical debate. There was also an "upswing which occurred
parallel to the Luther renaissance, that we have to look at
Erasmus primarily as a theologian and not as a moralist or a
linguist."' Henry J. McSorley, a Roman Catholic scholar,
examines the debate in light of ecumenism. Biographers of
Erasmus include: Preserved Smith, Johan Huizinga, Roland H.
Sainton, John Joseph Mangan, Ephraim Emerton, and George
Faludy. John M. Todd, Richard Marius, Gerhard Ebeling,
Frantz Funck-Brentano, and E. G. Schwiebert have written
regarding Luther. Authors who have written specifically on
the debate include: Robert H. Murray, Gottfried G. Krodel,
John W. O'Malley, Charles E. Hambr ick-Stowe, James D. Tracy
and Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle.
' Gottfried G. Krodel, "Erasmus�Luther: One Theology,
One Method, Two Results." Concordia Theological Monthly 41:
(November, 1970): 468.
Definitions
The following definitions by Harry J. McSorley should
aid in the understanding of the subject.
Bondage to Sin - Man has freely and willing yielded
"himself to sin and the consequent slavery to sin."* The
biblical doctrine of bondage to sin is explained by Paul "as
an active power which dominates, enslaves, dwells in and
imprisons (Rom. 7:23) the sinner."' Man cannot escape this
"condition unless he is ^brought with a price' (I Cor. 6:20;
7:23)."* Man is not able to free himself, liberation comes
only through faith in Jesus Christ.
The term "unfree or enslaved will" is not a bibli
cal term. Scripture is not interested in describ
ing man's will as unfree or enslaved. It teaches
simply but unmistakably that sinful man is a slave
to his sin: he cannot escape from it and even
yields himself up to it obediently. The scrip
tural doctrine is the bondage of man, not the
bondage of the will.*
The Biblical Meaning of Freedom
1. Natural freedom is described as freedom of
* Harry J. McSorley, Luther: Right or Wrong; An
Ecumenical-Theological Study of Luther's Malor Work^ The
Bondage of the Will^ (Minneapolis, Augsburg Publishing
House, 1969), 48.
' Ibid.
� Ibid.
� Ibid., 49.
7choice or free will and is "presupposed on every page of
the Scriptures."** It is distinct from Plato, Plotinus and
Descartes with their belief in the body-soul dualism. It is
also distinct from that of an Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas
who hold an intellect-will psychology. The Bible shows "the
heart ( leb-Jcardia ) is not only the central organ of the body
and the seat of physical life, but also the source and seat
of man's thoughts, understanding, decisions and volition.
The will as a power or faculty of volition is as unknown to
the biblical writers as it was to the vast majority of
ancient Greek thinkers."" The verb edudokeo denotes man's
choice between two possibilities and "God's election of the
Christian community."*' McSorley asserts that since the
Bible uses the same word to express human choice and elec
tion, one can argue "that man himself acts freely, that he
is able to will or not will, choose or not choose that which
he in fact wills or chooses.""
The Scripture is clear that origin of sin was an act of
disobedience in contrast to Zoroastr ianism or Marcionism
which attribute sin "to God or a dualist ic principle.""
" Ibid., 31.
" Ibid., 31-32.
" Ibid., 33.
" Ibid.
*? Ibid., 38.
82. Circumstantial freedom is defined "in the sense of
political or bodily freedom (or imprisonment), or of slavery
as opposed to the social status of a freeman, then we are
dealing with that which we have called circumstantial or its
absence . "**
3. Acquired freedom is Christian freedom whereby a Chris
tian "is freed from sin by Jesus Christ (Jn. 8:34,36).""
This freedom, however, is not from of the law of sin and
death. "Christian freedom is found in those who live
according to the law of the Spirit."*' Christian freedom
has an essential gift-character.
Other Definitions
Prevenient grace - Augustine realized that man needs
preparation to receive God's grace. This preliminary work
favorably disposed the soul of the elect toward
God's saving purpose. After the prevenient grace
had paved the way, man was changed in his inner
being in that he was now ready to co-operate with
God. Now the gratia co-operans, the grace of God
assisting man, became active in the sinner's soul.
If man accepted faith in Christ, he now became the
full recipient of God's saving grace. Through all
this a change within man's heart had been effected
which inclined it toward the good. New began the
process of man's justification.**
*� Ibid., 44.
** Ibid.
*' Ibid., 45.
*� E. G. Schwiebert, Luther and his Times (Saint Louis:
Concordia Publishing House, 1950), 159.
9Meritum de Conaruo - Winning God's approval.
Weritum de Condigno - "Merit that is sufficient for
receiving Christ's saving grace.""
For Bonaventura, God's light made it "possible for man
to see things in their 'transcendental simplicity,'"" know
God, and win His approval. This meant conformity with God
and won man Meritum de Congruo. With this came freely given
grace which aided man to receive Weritum de Condigno which
made it possible to receive Christ's saving grace.
Thomas taught that the infusion of God's grace
created a special, new attitude which he called
the habitus. This newly "informed soul" with its
liberated will would now be able to act upon the
faculties of the soul. The new man was able to
win the Meritum de Congruo, for he was no longer a
slave to sin. Thomas' conception of justification
was a simultaneous act of God's infused grace,
turning man's will toward God and causing him
inwardly to break away from sin. All this happens
through the faith which must perfect itself with
God's co-operating grace. St. Thomas' view of
justification has often been likened to a soul
that is inwardly sick and must be slowly healed
through God's infusion of grace until it triumphs
in love."
" Ibid., 167.
" Ibid.
" Ibid., 167-168.
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CHAPTER 2
Historical Background
The Doctrine of Free Will
Early Christians were faced with the responsibility of
formulating doctrines. Councils dealt with some of these
issues such as the Trinity. Many errors were propagated by
pagan mystery religions. The early Church Fathers were also
confronted by Stoic philosophy and Gnosticism which believed
"that man is exhorably controlled by fate."* This resulted
in fatalism and relieved man of responsibility. The Church
rejected this fatalism, and did not concentrate on man's
responsibility. Their motive was theological in order to
insure the holiness of God.
To the Fathers this meant that sin could not be
attributed to any personal principle of evil
co-exiting with the good God, or to the material
creation of a creator-God as opposed to the
redeemer-God. It meant further that man could not
have been created naturally evil by the good God
and that the good God was in no way responsible
for sin. Sin had to originate from some change in
* Henry J. McSorley, Luther: Right or Wrong? An
pcumenical-Theological Study of Luther's Malor Work The
Bondage of the Will^ (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing
House, 1969), 58.
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man for which man himself was responsible, a
change that he freely willed.'
The August inian-Pelagian controversy emerged in the
fifth century. "Both of these parties had admitted that
man's will was somehow affected by the divine will. The
difference, the hopeless and perpetual difference, had been
on the question of the possibility of good action through
the human impulse alone.'"
St. Augustine explained the doctrine of free will in De
Libero Arbitrio (388-395). He wrote this boolt in response
to the Pelagian view. He developed these basic teachings:
1. God is not the author of moral evil.
2. The first cause for evil is not nature, but the
free will of man.
3. God gave man free will in order to live justly,
not for the purpose of sinning.
4. God does have foreknowledge of our sins, but this
does not imply he causes them.
5. Sin is interpreted in a narrow and broad sense.
Sin in its narrow definition is that there is knowledge and
results from the abuse of free will. In its broad sense, it
results from ignorance or weakness.
6. Sin is a voluntary defect, an absence of good.
* Ibid., 60.
' Ephraim Emerton, Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam,,
(New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1899). 381.
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7. If an action cannot be avoided, it is not sin.
8. "Fallen man does not have the free will to choose
a truly just way of living."* This implies an enslaved
will .
In contrast to Augustine, Pelagius viewed sin as an
imitation of Adam and thereby denied original sin. Man was
born in a neutral condition with the capacity for good or
evil. "Sin was not a 'substance' which could be handed on
and itself act upon human nature, but a quality to be dis
cerned in individual actions."' This implied that man had
the possibility of sinlessness. However, man must cooperate
with God as He guides and illuminates.
Augustine criticizes Pelagius that he put "righteous
ness and salvation outside Christ and His Church."* Augus
tine and Pelagius differ on the interpretation of God's
grace. Pelagius spoke about general grace and Augustine on
special grace. For Augustine, "man begins to have good
merits only after he has been given God's grace-'"
The canons of the Council of Carthage, May of 418, were
formulated to combat the Pelagian view of original sin. The
Council of Ephesus (431) condemned the Pelagian heresy.
* McSorley, op. cit., 67.
' John Ferguson, Pelagius. (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons
Ltd., 1956), 160.
� Ibid., 69.
' McSorley, op. cit., 98.
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Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) preserved the tradition of
Augustine. He agreed that man is enslaved to sin and cannot
free himself from this condition. Man can only be freed
from sin by the grace of Jesus Christ. Christian liberty is
freedom from the law, sin and death. Thomas emphasized that
freedom was not that it was from something, but for some
thing. This can be compared to the Law which has been
replaced by the law of the Spirit. Christians are not bound
by the ceremonial laws of the Old Testament, but are obliged
to obey the moral law. Compliance is not from compulsion or
fear, but by the liberty of the Spirit. God's "grace frees
men to fulfill the law-"* The Holy Spirit teaches, guides
and helps man to fulfill the law of the Spirit.
Thomas did not deny that free will was involved in
"conversion, as Zach. 1:3 implies, but he cites Jer. 31:18
and Lam. 5:21 to show that the free will cannot turn to God
unless God turns man's will to himself!"* From Augustine to
Aquinas, the Church tradition upheld the existence of free
will, but not the Pelagian view which exaggerated the power
of free will without grace.
Duns Scotus (1264-1308) and William Ockham (1300-1349)
raised questions regarding Thomas' teachings. The Ockham-
Biel (Biel d. 1495) school which resulted has been labeled
Ibid., 180.
Ibid., 206.
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as "Semi-Pelagian." Their position was named the "modern
way." "At Trent, the 'modern way' (via atoderna) , whose
chief spokesmen were Ockham and Biel, was in no way con
demned; therefore no Catholic theologian is forbidden to
adopt this theological position."" The doctrine of Ockham-
Biel school was
that fallen man, by his natural powers of reason
and free will, without the aid of any divine help
other than God's general concursus, can prepare or
dispose himself for justification. According to
this teaching a sinner, by doing that which he is
capable of doing ( facere guod in se est^ by his
own natural, fallen powers, without any special
preparation of the will or illumination of the
mind by the Holy Spirit can merit the grace of
justification by a meritum de congruo.
McSorley states that Luther saw this teaching as a
Catholic accepted, but contrary to the Gospel. McSorley
agrees with Luther that this teaching was an abuse and "the
lack of vigilance by the Church's teaching authority con
cerning the sound preaching and teaching of a central truth
of the Gospel, namely, the doctrine that we are 'justified
freely by grace'."**
Historical Setting
By the sixteenth century, there had been many changes
in the Church. "By means of a number of election decrees.
" Ibid., 187.
" Ibid., 190.
" Ibid.
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the laity had been excluded from the administrative affairs
of the church, which consequently became in personnel, cult,
and culture intrinsically a church of priests."*' The
church also reduced many of its services to the community
and grew increasingly wealthy.
One of the greatest changes of the sixteenth century
was the discovery of new lands and new land routes. The
Mediterranean Seaports were challenged by new routes in the
Atlantic. With the discovery of new lands, came almost
unlimited wealth. There were new opportunities for trading
and investments. The world was changing also politically
with the rise of nationalism and the acknowledgment of
the rights and value of individuals. "The break-up of the
Holy Roman Empire undoubtedly prepared men's minds for the
break-up of the Holy Roman Church, more especially in Ger
many where an awakening national consciousness greatly
helped the Reformers."**
The movements of the Renaissance and the Reformation
began in the sixteenth century. "Both were movements of
reform. Unlike many of the revolutionary movements of the
twentieth century they looked with no disdain upon the past,
but sought to correct the immediate past by return to a past
" Harold J. Grimm, The Reformation Era 1500-1650. (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), 17.
** Leonard Elliott Binns, Erasmus the Reformer. (Lon
don: Methuen and Company Ltd., 1923), 13.
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more remote."" The Renaissance created "an intellectual
atmosphere which fostered certain Reformation movements such
as revival of biblical studies, the rejection of scholas
ticism, and the undermining of the ecclesiastical authority
of the Roman church."*' Those in the Reformation movement
rejected Renaissance humanism which should not be confused
with the atheistic humanism of this century or eighteenth
century Deistic humanism. The Renaissance humanism was
basically religious and tried to find its basis on "the
person of Christ portrayed and presented to men through the
church and the scripture."*'
The Life of Erasmus (14667-1535)
Erasmus was born at Rotterdam on 27 October, most
probably in the year 1466. The illegitimacy of
his birth has thrown a veil of mystery over his
descent and kinship. . .Acutely sensitive to the
taint in his origin, he did more to veil the
secret than to reveal it.**
Richard L. DeMolen gives the year of his birth as 1469.
Erasmus began his schooling at the age of four in Gouda . At
** Roland H. Bainton, Erasmus of Christendom^ (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), 5.
*' Robert G. Kleinhans, "Luther and Erasmus, Another
Perspective." Church History 39 (December, 1970): 459.
*' Ibid.
** Johan Huizinga, Erasmus and the Age of Reformation.
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), 4-5.
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six he studied "at Deventer where he came under the
influence of the Brethren of Common Life."" In 1487 he
entered the monastery at Steyn and was ordained April 15,
1492. While at the monastery, he read Jerome and Lorenzo
Valla. From his time with the Brethren of the Common Life,
he learned the Devotio Moderna . He was also influenced the
Renaissance humanism. Because of the influence of Henry of
Bergen, the bishop of Cambrai, by 1495 he was able to study
theology at Montaigu College which is associated with the
University of Paris. While at Montaigu, he became friends
with William Blount who invited him to England." During
his time at Oxford, he was influenced by John Colet and Sir
Thomas More. He also traveled to Italy. "While en route
from Italy to London, Erasmus devoted the idle hours to
composing an early draft of his best remembered work. The
Praise of Folly. Generally regarded as a literary master
piece..."" In this satire he criticizes all men including
monks and academicians as they indulge in self-love, sensu
ality, intemperance, and are lazy. He tried to direct
attention to corruption in the church, family, government,
and the university. "As Erasmus perceived it, institutional
** Richard L. DeMolen, ed . Erasmus of Rotterdam; A
Quincentennial Symposium (New York: Twayne Publishers,
1971), 16.
" Ibid., 18.
" Richard L. DeMolen, The Spirituality of Erasmus of
Rotterdam. (Nieuwkoop; De Graaf Publishers, 1987), 6.
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decay was simply a manifestation of a general disorienta
tion. Sixteenth-century society was caught up in the self
ish pursuit of pleasure because it had lost its perspec
tive .
In 1514 he decided to live in Basel where he later
wrote De Libero Arbitrio. He left Basel in April of 1529,
but returned in 1535 because of ill health. He died in June
of 1536."
There have been three ways in evaluating Erasmus: as an
ambivalent reformer, a devotee of reason, or as a forerunner
of Luther's Reformation. His indecision has been traced to
his own personality and events surrounding his birth. Also
he insisted "upon maintaining his own program above and
independent of all parties."" He is seen as being con
cerned for his own physical welfare and avoided conflict at
all costs. As a devotee of reason, he is considered as "a
forerunner of the Enlightenment."" His humanism "emerged
again in the Enlightenment to help shape the modern
world."" As a forerunner to the Enlightenment, he is seen
as having "his own serious program for the renewal of the
" Ibid., 7.
" B. A. Gerrish, ed . Reformers in Profile. Lewis W.
Spitz, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), 64-65.
" DeMolen, Erasmus of Rotterdam. 49.
" Ibid., 50.
" Ibid., 50-51.
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church and the improvement of society."*'
The character of Erasmus has been studied by Nelson
H. Minnich, a historian from the Catholic University of
America and Dr. W. W. Meissner, a Jesuit psychiatrist.
Their interpretation is derived from studying Johan Hui
zinga 's biography.
Erasmus lived under what Gregory Rochlin calls
"the tyranny of narcissism." His life appears to
have been an incessant seeking for recognition,
acceptance, and adulation from his fellow man.
Questioning or criticism of his motives or perfor
mance could prompt in him an anxious and
threatened response which mobilized his resources
and rushed them to the defense of his embattled
narcissism. Erasmus' sense of self-worth and
self-esteem was continually in jeopardy and
required constant reinforcement. His feelings of
inadequacy were reflected in his depression, dis
illusionment, skepticism, and isolation. Much of
his Herculean literary labor can be seen as a
gigantic effort to redeem some sense of inner
value, as though he sought to build an outer faced
of accomplishment and sophistication to conceal a
self -percept ion of worthlessness and vileness.**
John C. Olin who quotes the Minnich-Me issner analysis,
however does not agree with their conclusion. He does not
believe they have an adequate understanding with the Eras-
mian corpus. Olin takes exception to their idea of Erasmus'
indecision and ambivalence. "The charge of indecision and
ambivalence has to be considered in the full context of
Erasmus' goals and labors. Erasmus did have clear aims.
*' Ibid., 51.
*� John C. Olin, Six Essays on Erasmus. New York:
Fordham University Press, 1979) 69.
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firm convictions, and high ideals, and he held to them with
remarkable constancy throughout his life."" Erasmus was
not
a pathetically troubled and sick individual whose
"character" was damaged at the outset by his
rejection by his father. The picture is unworthy
of so great a man, and what is more it is untrue.
Indeed it smacks of the kind of attack which rival
scholastic theologians launched against him in his
own day, save that a Freudian garb now cloaks the
rancor and dismay of his adversaries."
The Life of Luther (1483-1546)
"Martin Luther was born on November 10, 1483, in the
little town of Eisleben in east-central Germany."** Germany
at this time was only a geographical expression. "The
Germans were backward both politically and intellectually in
the Middle Ages..."" Luther's father, Hans, was a miner
who had prospered and was able to send Martin to the univer
sity. In 1501 Luther entered the University at Erfurt where
the via modezna was practiced. Via moderna, was not human
ism. Luther "inevitably became an Ockhamist, or a
" Ibid., 70.
" Ibid., 71.
" Richard Marius, Luther a Biography. (Philadelphia
and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1974), 17.
" Ibid., 18.
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nominalist."" In addition to being influenced by Ockham,
he became familiar with Augustine and mystical devotional
literature .
July, 1505 he was returning from school and "was
caught in a sudden thunderstorm near Stotternheim. In
terror he cried out to St. Anne that he would become a monk
if his life were spared."" He was ordained in 1507 and by
1512 had earned a doctorate in theology. "Luther found no
Christian peace in the monastery. He made every effort to
do so..."" He was "troubled by the meaning of 'righteous
ness of God' and particularly by Paul's statement that the
righteousness of God is revealed in the gospel (Rom.
1:17)."" Searching for its meaning, he began to understand
that "the righteous man lives by a gift of God, that is to
say, out of faith... the passive righteousness of God means
that a merciful God justifies us through faith."" This has
been called his "Tower Experience" which was a "basic
reorientation and the most profound mutation in his
" Gerhard Ebeling, Luther An Introduction to his
Thought, translated by R. A. Wilson (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1970), 36.
" B. A. Gerrish, ed . Reformers in Profile,, F. Edward
Cranz, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967, 89-90.
" Ibid., 90.
" Ibid., 94.
" Ibid., 95.
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thinking.
In 1517 "Martin Luther was thirty-four years old when
his Ninety-five Theses swept the German Nation."" The
Theses threatened the church with the practice of selling
indulgences. "Pope Leo X issued a bull (Exsurge Dominef
June 15, 1520) threatening excommunication unless Luther
submitted within sixty days ... Luther refused to recant
unless convinced of error by Holy Scripture or by clear
arguments of reason."" Luther declared, "Here I stand, I
can do no other, God help me!"" By May, 1521 Luther had
been declared an outlaw with the issue of the Edict of
Worms .
"On Friday, March 6, 1522, Luther arrived in Witten
berg .. .wearing a sword, and accompanied by several
knights."** He preached that Christians should not resort
to the sword and that the Word alone should execute the
needed reforms. Pope Hadrian VI attempted a measure of
reform, but it was too little and too late. In June, 1524,
the Peasants' Revolt broke out at Stuhlingen. "The revolt
" Ibid.
" Mark U. Edwards, Jr., Luther's Last Battles.
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1.
*� Gerrish, op. cit., 98.
** R. Gerald Hobbs, "Profile: Martin Luther." Touch
stone 1, No. 3, (October, 1983): 33.
** E. G. Schwiebert, Luther and his Times. (Saint
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950), 541.
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quickly spread to all the districts about Lake Constance and
then to Swabia and Wurtemberg .
One reason for Luther's delay in answering Erasmus was
that he married Catherine de Bora, a former nun in a Cister
cian convent, June 13, 1525. She had "been convinced of the
folly and sinfulness of monastic vows"** and escaped with
eight others in 1523. The couple had three children.
From 1531 to 1546 Luther was frequently ill with kidney
stones, arthritis, angina attacks, an ulcer on his leg, and
problems with his ears. Luther died of heart failure
February 18, 1546 at the age of sixty-two.**
Some investigators have confidently concluded that
Luther suffered from a manic-depressive psychosis.
Among the symptoms of this illness in his later
years they list his frequent bouts of depression
and spiritual temptation, his death-wish, his
vulgar and scatological language, his outbursts of
rage and vilification, and his visions of and
contests with the devil.*'
Specific Events Leading to the Debate
Erasmus was introduced to Luther by a letter in 1516
from George Spalatin, a mutual friend. He wrote that
Luther, a local monk, "had questioned Erasmus' understanding
*' Grimm, op. cit., 171.
** J. E. Riddle, Luther and his Times (London: John W.
Parker, 1837), 198.
** Edwards, loc. cit.
*� Ibid., 15.
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of the fifth chapter of Romans..."*' On October 19, 1516,
Luther wrote to Spalatin detailing his criticism of Erasmus'
theology. His four points were: (1) He lacked understand
ing between just it ia fidei and legis. (2) He had no under
standing of heretical sin. (3) He needed to study St.
Augustine's writings against Pelagius. (4) He had "no
feeling for the early church tradition concerning justifica
tion by faith."** Luther, however, "expressed his deep
respect for Erasmus and his work."**
Erasmus heard more regarding Luther
after the appearance of the Ninety-Five Theses.
Erasmus accepted him as a fellow worker for the
reform of the Roman Church and like Rubeanus,
Hutten, Lang, Pirckheimer, Oecolampadius, Bucer,
and others, regarded Luther as the champion of the
Gospel and the deliverer of Germany from the
bondage of Rome. At the time he posted his
Theses, Luther had never met Erasmus nor cor
responded with him, but was quite familiar with
his writings. Already in 1516 he had misgivings
about Erasmus as a theologian.'*
"Erasmus at first considered it beneath the dignity of
a famous scholar with a European reputation to become too
concerned with this obscure Wittenberg monk; but as the
*' Terrence M. Reynolds, "Was Erasmus Responsible for
Luther? A Study of the Relationship of the Two Reformers
and their Clash over the Question of the Will." Concordia
Theological Quarterly 41 (October, 1977): 20.
** Gottfried G. Krodel, "Erasmus�Luther: One Theol
ogy, One Method, Two Results." Concordia Theological Monthly
41 (November, 1970): 654.
*� Ibid.
*� Schwiebert, op. cit., 684.
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Roman plot against Luther began to thicken, Erasmus* sym
pathy grew.
When Pope Leo X, in his Bull Exsurge Domine of
June 15th, 1520, condemned Luther's writings to
the flames and allowed him sixty days in which to
recant, Erasmus, doing violence to his fundamental
prudence and reserve, intervened at Rome on
Luther's behalf, showing great determination and
courage, and writing letter after letter, demand
ing a suspension of the sentences of excommunica
tion and advising that in the case of the Wit
tenberg insurgent other methods should be tried
than those of intolerance and constraint.**
From 1518 to 1521 Erasmus was determined that Luther
would receive a fair hearing, but took care that he did
not become involved personally. Erasmus "defended the man
Luther, but not what he taught .. .Erasmus saw from the very
beginning the dangers imminent in what he termed Luther's
immoderation . ""
It was not possible that Erasmus with his scholarly
reputation could remain on the sidelines. "He must be
either for Luther or against him."'* Erasmus wrote to
Mosellanus on August 8, 1522: "All want me to attack
Luther. I do not approve of Luther's cause, but have many
�* Ibid., 685.
*' Frantz Funck-Brentano Luther . translated by E. F.
Buckley, (London: Academy Books, 1939), 174.
'* Daniel Preus, "Luther and Erasmus: Scholastic
Humanism and the Reformation," Concordia Theological Quar
terly 46 (April-July, 1982): 222.
** Schwiebert, op. cit., 685.
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reasons for preferring any other task to this."" There
had been no direct correspondence from 1519 to April 1524
between Erasmus and Luther and they never met face to
face ."
The Peasants' Revolt in 1523-24 also must be considered
as deepening the rift between Luther and Erasmus. The
revolt was considered to be the result of "a misunder
standing of Luther's doctrine of ^Christian liberty'.""
More than 100,000 had died. Erasmus realized "violence
begets violence, and that the abolition of feudal taxation,
which he had proposed long before, could have prevented
it."" He held that the Gospel does not give any man rights
over another .
Luther wrote to Oecolampadius who was working on a
commentary on Isaiah. In this letter he compared Erasmus to
Moses, but in an unfavorable light.
Perhaps he, like Moses, will die in the land of
Moab, for he is powerless to guide men to those
higher studies which lead to divine blessedness.
I should very much like him to cease expounding
the Scriptures, for he is not equal to the task...
He has done enough in exposing the evil, but can
not show for the good (as I see it) or point the
" Robert H. Murray, Erasmus and Luther; Their
Attitude to Toleration, (London; Society for Promoting
Christian Knowledge, 1920), 215.
" Ibid., 215-216.
" George Faludy, Erasmus of Rotterdam, (London; Eyre
and Spott iswoode, 1970), 199.
" Ibid.
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way to the promised land.**
This letter pricked the pride of Erasmus and decided to
reply. Erasmus decided to take his time with his response
in order to demonstrate his theological abilities. In doing
so, he could influence Luther's opinion of him. However,
Duke George, the ruler of Saxony, did not like Erasmus'
delaying tactics and wanted him to defend the Church against
Luther. The Duke wrote in a stinging letter of May 21, 1524
"to separate himself from Luther's faction, and to show by
some work of his that he had nothing in common with
Luther .
On April 15, 1524, Luther wrote Erasmus: "Please remain
now what you have always professed yourself desirous of
being: a mere spectator of our tragedy."**
In order to be able to combat Luther with a
clear conscience Erasmus had naturally to chose a
point on which he differed from Luther in his
heart. It was not one of the more superficial
parts of the Church's structure. For these he
either, with Luther, cordially rejected, such as
ceremonies, observances, fasting, etc., or, though
more moderately than Luther, he had his doubts
about them, as the sacraments or the primacy of
St. Peter. So he naturally came to the point
where the deepest gulf yawned between their
natures, between their conceptions of the essence
of faith, and thus to the central and eternal
problem of good and evil, guilt and compulsion,
liberty and bondage, God and man. Luther
�* John Joseph Mangan, Life, Character and Influence of
Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam. Volume Two, (New York: Mac-
Millan Company, 1927), 244.
*� Ibid.
** Huizinga, op. cit., 162
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confessed in his reply that her indeed the vital
point had been touched."
After a long delay, Erasmus decided to comply with
requests that had been made on him to publish a book against
Luther on the determinism of the will. He was "displeased
with Luther's antinomian views."** "Erasmus's Free Will was
published on September 1st, 1524, and reached Wittenberg in
the same month."** Luther wrote on November, 1 that it
nauseated him and felt it was wearisome that it required a
reply. "In reading it he was more than once tempted to
throw the book under his seat."**
'* Ibid.
** Faludy, loc. cit.
** Funck-Brentano, op. cit., 179.
** Ibid.
29
CHAPTER 3
The Debate
De Libero Arbitrio
Erasmus begins De Libero Arbitrio by stating that the
problem of freedom of the will is a perplexing labyrinth.
Free will has been discussed by philosophers and theologians
and more recently in Erasmus* time, Carlstadt and Eck .
�'Martin Luther took up the whole controversy once more--and
in a rather heated fashion--with his Assertion concerning
the freedom of the will.*** Erasmus asserts that he is a
"fly" contending with an "elephant," Luther. He uses rheto
ric to prove his humbleness. The purpose of his writing is
"to analyze and not to judge, to inquire and not to dog
matize."* He admits that he has a dislike to fighting. He
raises several issues: If God's foreknowledge is contingent
on anything man can contribute to his eternal salvation or
* Ernst F. Winter, translator, Erasmus-Luther - Dis
course on Free Will^ (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing
Co., 1961), 4-5.
* Ibid., 7.
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it is from operative grace? Is the good or evil which man
accomplishes "done out of mere necessity, or whether we are
rather in a state of passive acceptance."'
Erasmus narrows his diatribe to Luther's assertion that
everything man does is not from free will, but from neces
sity.
I shall confine my controversy strictly to this
one doctrine, with no other object than to make
the truth more plain by throwing together Scrip
tural texts and arguments, a method of investiga
tion that has always been considered most proper
for scholars.*
He refers to Augustine, but misrepresents his think
ing.' He states Augustine wrote "that God causes both good
and evil in us, and that he rewards us for his good works
wrought in us and punishes us for the evil deeds done in
us."* Erasmus considers this is a loophole where mankind is
perpetuated in its battle against the flesh. He asks how
can man better his conduct. If mankind is left in this
ceaseless battle, then God must enjoy human distress and
mankind is forever entrenched in his wickedness and car
nality. His argument is how can people respond to such a
' Ibid., 9.
* E. Gordon Rupp, translator and editor, Luther and
Erasmus; Free Will and Salvation^ Volume XVII of The
Library of Christian Classics^ (Philadelphia; The Westmin
ster Press, 1969), 36.
' Winter, op. cit., 11. (See authors's footnote 12).
* Ibid.
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God as implied by Augustine.
He defines freedom of the will as "the power of the
human will whereby man can apply to or turn away from that
which leads us unto eternal salvation."'
In order to substantiate his inquiry, Erasmus examines
the authorities which address the question of the freedom of
the will. He lists many of the early Church Fathers, but
states the issue should be settled by the Scripture. He
acknowledges that the Scripture seems to contradict itself
over the issue of free will. An Old Testament Scripture
which supports free will is Ecclesiastics 15:14-18 which
states man can choose good or evil. He acknowledges that
after the Fall, reason or intellect has been darkened by
sin, but it was not extinguished. The will cannot improve
itself by natural means, but by the grace of God. "By the
grace of God which forgives sin, the freedom of the will
has been restored to such a degree that according to the
Pelagians eternal life can now be gained even without the
help of further grace."' Pelagius, a British monk of the
4th and 5th centuries, was "declared heretical by the Church
Council of Ephesus (431)."' Erasmus interprets Pelagianism
in a modified form. The modified form, however, was also
' Ibid., 20.
� Ibid., 23.
� Ibid. (See Winter's footnote 2).
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condemned by the Church in 529."
Erasmus considers grace as a "freely given gift."** He
cites four varieties of grace:
1. Common grace. This first grace has been corrupted
by sin, but not extinguished by it. This grace allows the
reception of grace.
2. Extraordinary or operative grace. This grace
allows the undeserving sinner to repentance. The sinner has
not forsaken his inclination for sinning, but is capable of
giving, praying, listening to sermons, and able to perform
ethically good works "in a way for obtaining the ultimate
grace."** God does not withhold this grace from anyone, but
invites all to receive His repentance. However, this grace
can be resisted so "no one perishes except through his own
fault."*'
3. Efficient grace. This grace is called cooperative
as it encourages what has begun.
4. Grace which leads to the final goal.
These can be summarized as "the first excites, the
second promotes and the third leads to the goal."**
*� Ibid. (See Winter's footnote 2).
** Ibid., 28.
** Ibid., 29.
*' Ibid., 30.
** Ibid.
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New Testament Scriptures which he determined acknow
ledge free will are Matthew 19:17, Romans 2:5, 1 Timothy
6:12, 2 Timothy 2:6, and James 1:13-15.
Concluding his section on Scriptural proofs for free
will, he quotes from Luther's Assertio .
This article must be revoked. I have expressed
it improperly, when I said that the free will,
before obtaining grace, is really an empty name.
I should have said straightforwardly that the free
will is really a fiction and a label without
reality, because it is in no man's power to plan
any evil or good. As the article of Wycliffe,
condemned at Constance, correctly teaches: every
thing takes place by absolute necessity.**
His purpose is to show that 2 Tim. 3:16 seems irrelevant if
all things happen by necessity. There is no purpose for
obedience if all things happen as Luther states by inevi
table necessity.
Erasmus declared that he wrote his diatribe as an
inquiry. In this vein, he also recognizes the Scriptural
proofs against the free will. From Exodus 9, 12 and 16, and
Romans 9:14, the Scriptures speak of the hardening of
Pharaoh's heart. He admits this is a contradiction to God's
character .
Origen resolves the difficulty in the third book
of his Commentary on St. John as follows: God
permitted an occasion of induration, but the
guilt is Pharaoh's. His malice caused him to
become more obstinate, rather than penitential.
Just as after the same rain well-tended land
produces the best fruit, neglected land however
thorns and thistles; just as wax becomes soft and
clay hard under the same sun, so God's gentleness.
" Ibid., 44-45.
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tolerating a sinner, causes a change of mind in
one and a hardening in evil in another. God shows
mercy to him who remembers his goodness and bet
ters himself. However, he hardens him who remem
bers his goodness and betters himself. However,
he hardens him who, though obtaining a respite for
a change of mind, does not care for God's goodness
and becomes worse.**
Isaiah 63:17 asks: "Why hast thou hardened our heart,
that we should not fear thee?" Erasmus quotes Origin's
interpretation of Jerome: "God hardens a sinner, when he
does not castigate him, and he pities a sinner, when he
summons him to do penance, by means of afflictions."*'
Jeremiah 20:7 uses the expression of a deceiver.
A deceiver is here meant to be someone who does
not restrain one from an aberration. Origen
considers such attitude more conducive to perfect
healing, just as the experienced surgeon values a
slow healing of a wound, permitting the pus to
exude more readily. The result is a more lasting
cure... In reality Pharaoh was created with a will
enabling to move in both directions. He has turned
evil on his own account, since he preferred to
follow his own inclination, rather than obey God's
commandments . **
Erasmus also considers the question if God's foreknow
ledge is compatible to man's free will. He cites Lorenzo
Valla.
Foreknowledge does not cause what is to take
place. Even we know many things which will be
happening. They will not happen because we now
them, but vice versa. An eclipse of the sun does
not occur because astronomers predict it, but it
can be predicted, precisely because it will take
** Ibid., 47.
*' Ibid., 48.
*� Ibid.
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place . "
Erasmus also cites the election of Jacob over Esau
(Genesis 25:23) and the clay in the potter's hand (Romans
9:20). He notes that these passages seem to contradict
others, but he there are more than six hundred passages
which require man to act. Several are: Ezekiel 18:31, 2
Timothy 2:21, Philippians 2:12. If man can do nothing, then
why has God admonished man to do something he can't?
Erasmus now turns to examine Luther's proofs. Erasmus
states that Luther understands "flesh" in Genesis 6:3 as
something which needs mortified. Erasmus' response is that
there is weakness in the nature of man which inclines him to
sin. However, God's response to sin is not severity, but
gentleness. "God affirms he does not want to retain man for
eternal punishment, but rather out of mercy [he wants] to
punish him already here [on earth]."*"
Erasmus challenges Luther that man is entirely flesh.
Erasmus maintains that man is also spirit and has a soul.
He states that part of the soul is reason, the directive
'
faculty. He also pointed out that Paul distinguishes the
carnal man from the spiritual man.
Erasmus summarizes that he has shown there are
Scriptures which establish the freedom of the will and
" Ibid., 49.
*� Ibid., 62.
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others which deny it. How can this be? He states that each
person comes looking for something and interprets that which
he finds for his own purpose. Erasmus urges to seek a more
moderate opinion.
He advises that care should be taken regarding the
problem of divine justice and mercy. "Some felt compelled
to assume two gods: one for the Old Testament, who was able
to be only just, but not simultaneously merciful, and one
for the New Testament, who could only be merciful, but not
just . ""
The past has shows that Manichaeus conceived of two
natures in man, one which only sinned and the other which
could not. Pelagius leaned too far to free will and Scotus
affirmed that human free will was able to perform ethically
good works which lead to salvation. Luther concludes that
one should avoid overconf idence in their own merits. Eras
mus writes
since all things have three parts, a beginning, a
continuation and an end, grace is attributed to
the two extremities, and only in continuation does
the free will effect something. Two causes meet
in this same work, the grace of God and the human
will, grace being the principal cause and will a
secondary, since it is impotent without the prin
cipal cause, while the latter has sufficient
strength by itself. Thus, while the fire burns
through its natural strength, the principal cause
is still God, who acts through the fire. God
alone would indeed suffice, and without Him fire
could not burn. Due to this combination, man must
ascribe his total salvation to divine grace, since
it is very little that the free will can effect.
" Ibid., 84.
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and even that comes from divine grace which has at
first created free will and then redeemed and
healed it. Thus are placated, if they can be
placated, those who will not tolerate that man has
some good which he does not owe to God. He owes
this also to God, but in another way and under
another title. Just as an inheritance coming in
equal share to the children, is not called a
benevolence, because it belongs by common law to
all. If beyond this common right a donation is
made to this or that child, it is called libera
lity. But children owe gratitude to their parents
also under the title of their inheritance."
Erasmus concludes that he has demonstrated there is
more Scriptural testimony for freedom of the will than that
which opposes it. Also with the aid of the Holy Spirit,
church leaders have taught it for thirteen centuries.
De Servo Arbitrio
Luther's response begins with a compliment that Erasmus
had surpassed him in his literary ability and intellect.
Erasmus had also artfully debated with restraint which made
it impossible for Luther to be angry with him. However, all
of Erasmus' arguments regarding free will have been stated
before and they are invalid arguments. He states that
Philip Melanchthon ' s book. Concerning Theological Questions
has refuted free will. This book so impressed Luther that
he felt it should be included in the Church's canon in
contrast to Erasmus' worthless book. Luther states that he
had difficulty in responding to Erasmus' book "because of
" Ibid., 85-86.
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disgust, indignation and contempt."" He was persuaded by
faithful brethren to respond. However, in writing his own
book, he became confirmed in his own view. "Seeing the case
for free will argued with such great talents, yet leaving it
worse than it was before, is an evident proof that free will
is a downright lie."'*
He begins by centering on Erasmus* comment that he
disliked Luther's "assertions." Luther responds with his
definition: "I mean a constant adhering to and affirming of
your position, avowing and defending it, and invincibly
preserving in it... Far be it from us Christians to be skep
tics to the academics!"" He further states
Nothing is more known and characteristic among
Christians than assertions. Take away assertions
and you take away Christianity. Indeed, the Holy
Spirit is given to Christians from heaven, so that
He may in them glorify Christ and confess Him even
unto death. And to die for what you confess and
assert is not an assertion? What a clown I would
hold a man to be who does not really believe, nor
unwaveringly assert the things he is reproving
others with!"
Regarding the Scriptures, Luther states "God and the
Scriptures are two things, just like God and creation are
two things."" He admits that some Scripture passages are
" Ibid., 98.
" Ibid.
" Ibid., 100-101.
" Ibid., 101.
" Ibid., 103.
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obscure and complex. The reasons, however, are not because
of the subject, but ignorance of grammar and certain terms.
In spite of one's ignorance in these matters, the Scriptures
can be understood because Christ has become man. Man should
be encouraged as "Satan has frightened men from reading the
sacred writings, and has rendered Holy Scriptures con
temptible, so as to ensure his poisonous philosophy to
prevail in the church."'*
Luther accuses Erasmus that he has not mentioned Christ
regarding Christian piety. "As though you thought that
Christian piety is possible without Christ, if God be but
worshipped with one's whole heart as being a 'naturally most
benign God'."'* Luther denounces Erasmus by comparing him
to Lucian, a Greek of the second century. Lucian was a
witty and satirical writer who ridiculed Christianity.
Luther writes that Erasmus' confidence in his wit has
resulted in slippery writings which encourage recklessness
and discourage inquisitiveness regarding obtaining eternal
salvation .
It is not irreligious, curious or superfluous,
but extremely wholesome and necessary for a Chris
tian to know whether or not his will has anything
to do in matters pertaining to salvation. This,
let me tell you, is the very hinge upon which our
disputation turns. It is the crucial issue
between you and me- It is our aim to inquire what
free will can do, in what it is passive, and how
it is related to the grace of God. If we know
'* Ibid.
'* Ibid., 104.
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nothing of these things, we shall know nothing
whatsoever of Christianity, and shall be worse off
than all the heathens. Whoever does not under
stand this, let him confess that he is not a
Christian. But he who derides and ridicules
it, should know that he is the greatest foe of
Chr istians . . . I t is necessary to distinguish most
clearly between the power of God and our own,
between God's works and ours, if we are to live a
godly life."
Luther explains that God's foreknowledge has nothing to
do with contingency. "He foresees, purposes and does all
things according to His immutable, eternal and infallible
will . ""
Luther responds to Erasmus regarding the purpose of the
law. Luther denounces the Papal laws which have been used
to terrify, murder and burden them by confessions.
A good theologian teaches that the common people
should be restrained by the external power of the
sword when they do evil, as Paul teaches (Romans
13:1-4). But their conscience must not be fet
tered by false laws, and thereby be tormented for
sins there where God had willed to be no sins at
all. For consciences are bound by the law of God
alone. So that Papal tyranny, which falsely ter
rifies and murders the souls within, and uselessly
exhausts the bodies without, is to be banished
forthwith. Although it binds men to confession
and other burdens by external pressure, it fails
to restrain their minds, which are only the more
provoked into the hatred of both God and men.
Such external butchery of the body is in vain. It
just makes for hypocrites. So that tyrants, with
such laws, are nothing but raving wolves, robbers
and plunderers of souls. And now you, an
excellent counselor of souls, recommend to us once
more these barbarous soul-murderers, solely in
" Ibid., 106.
" Ibid.
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order to retrain them a little from outward sin.'*
Luther writes that Erasmus quoted many of the Church
Fathers. He asks: "Did anyone of them receive the Spirit
or work miracles in the name of the free will, or by the
power of the free will, or to confirm the free will?""
Luther refutes "if thou wilt" in Scripture as implying
free will. Luther claims that Erasmus came to this con
clusion by using "Arguments of Lady Reason. . .Reason, by her
conclusions and syllogisms interprets and twists the Scrip
tures of God whichever way she likes."'* By employing this
type of argument, truth can be twisted and divine things are
judged according to the customs and thoughts of man. The
purpose of the law (Romans 3:20) is the recognition of sin.
The law shows man's weakness and does not respond to its
avoidance. The Old Testament with its laws and threats do
not help, nor does the Scriptures or grace. Luther urged
that only by Christ crucified is there remission of sins.
It is entirely free, given through the mere mercy
of God, the Father, thus favoring us unworthy
creatures who deserve damnation rather than any
thing else. After this follow exhortations. They
are intended to animate those who are already
justified and have obtained mercy to be diligent
in the fruits of the Spirit and of the righteous
ness given them, to exercise themselves in love
and good works, and to bear courageously the cross
and all the other tribulations of this world.
This is the whole sum of the New Testament. But
'* Ibid., 107.
" Ibid., 115.
'* Ibid., 125.
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how little Erasmus understands of this matter is
manifest in not knowing how to distinguish between
the Old and the New Testaments. For he sees
nothing anywhere but laws and precepts by which
men may be formed in good manners. But what the
rebirth, renewal, regeneration and the whole work
of the Spirit are, he does not see."
Luther also comments on Erasmus' use of figures of
speech (trope). He maintains that by using these figures of
speech, Erasmus distorts the Scripture "where it speaks
against me, it twists all the words of divine promise and
declaration, just as it pleases, by discovering a figure of
speech in them. . .The Word of God must be taken in its plain
meaning, as the words stand...""
Luther concludes that man had nothing to do with his
creation and has nothing to endeavor to preserve himself.
His creation and preservation are
by the sole will of the omnipotent power and
goodness of God, who creates and preserves us
without ourselves. Yet, God does not work in us
without us, because He created and preserves us
for the very purpose that He might work in us and
we might cooperate with Him, whether that occurs
outside His kingdom and under His general omni
potence, or within His kingdom and under the
special power of His Spirit. So I say that man,
before he is regenerated into the new creation of
the Spirit's kingdom does and endeavors nothing to
prepare himself, and when he is regenerated he
does and endeavors nothing toward his perseverance
in that kingdom."
" Ibid., 126-127.
" Ibid., 128-129.
" Ibid., 132.
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CHAPTER 4
Analyses of the Debate
Method of the Debate
Erasmus' work is rather short, "covering only sixteen
folio pages."* Ephraim Emerton considers Erasmus having
done a careful examination of Old and New Testament Scrip
tures, but as "far as the argument itself is concerned, the
work is of little interest. Erasmus for the most part
carefully avoids original discussion and holds himself
closely to authority."'
Preserved Smith considers Erasmus' book "still readable
on account of its brevity, its moderation, and its wit. The
author's irony, as well as the force of his destructive
criticism, is nowhere better revealed than in the introduc
tory section of his pamphlet, not on the main question
* Ephraim Emerton, Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam (New
York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1899), 387.
' Ibid.
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itself, but on the principle of judging."* The Scripture is
to be the standard for judgment.
Richard Friedenthal claims that Erasmus became a pris
oner of his own argument as the argument was not based on
his free will, but on the authority and tradition of the
Church .
Offering few proofs of his own, he cited in sup
port of his theses passages out of the Bible and
the Fathers of the Church; he omitted those which
might have damaged his case. In his position as
advocate for ecclesiastical tradition Erasmus
found himself on dangerous ground, because from
the time of the early Councils, the Church had
unequivocally condemned the concept of free will,
using in evidence the name of Pelagius, which
thereafter became synonymous with condemnation.
Every declaration of free will was seen as
detracting from the greatness and omnipotence of
God, and as a dangerous challenged to the Church
as the trustee of salvation.*
John Joseph Mangan states that Erasmus was very cour
teous to Luther in order that Luther could be won back to
orthodox thinking.
In fact, we have nothing but praise for the manner
in which he went about his task. He started off
by saying that his intention was not to dogmatize,
but to elicit the truth. He then, like a good
scholastic, defines his terms, by showing what he
understands by Freewill as opposed to the con
trary. He then proves that almost all the fathers
of the Church recognized the freedom of the will,
and instances especially Origen, Tertullian,
Basil, Chrysostom, Cyril, John Damascene, Cyprian,
' Preserved Smith, Erasmus A Study of his Life. Ideals
and Place in History. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1923),
346.
* Richard Friedenthal, Luther His Life and Times.
translated by John Nowell (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovano-
vich. Inc., 1970), 452.
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Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine, and to
these he adds the Schoolmen, such as St. Thomas,
Scotus, Durandus, and others, including with them
the Popes and Councils together with the faculties
of theology in all universities.'
John Alfred Faulkner regards it as
a modest, moderate defense of the Catholic view in
its most evangelical phase; viz., that man is free
to accept or reject the grace of God; that that
grace is absolutely necessary; that it is given to
man, but that its gift does not supersede, but
rather stimulates and sanctifies, man's freedom.
It begins by saying that the question is a very
difficult one, and it is rather an act of piety to
fall back upon one's religious and moral con
sciousness, and say nothing further. But all the
worse it is to assert the bondage of the will,
because that would place the souls of men, espe
cially the ignorant masses, in the greatest dan
ger. They could easily derive from that the right
to sin.'
Faulkner considers Luther's reply as representing a
working God. "God is a restless actor, and will not allow
us to take a holiday."' In comparison to God, man is weak
and small. Man waits in humility upon God for his salvation
as he can do nothing.
The method and scope of the debate had two
serious weaknesses. It was the tedious manner
of that age to deal with one's opponent line by
line or at least paragraph by paragraph. This
is how Luther began, and it was fatal. The pres
sure of events on Luther in 1525, the watershed of
his career, was such that he could not possibly
hope to complete the debate on this scale, and he
* John Joseph Mangan, Life Character and Influence of
Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam. Volume Two, (New York: Mac-
Millan Company, 1927), 247.
' John Alfred Faulkner, Erasmus; The Scholar ^ (Cin
cinnati: Jennings and Graham, 1907 ) , 173.
' Ibid., 175.
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himself later admitted that he took no notice at
all of the last chapters of Erasmus, which are
perhaps the best part of the work.'
Language of thf^ Debate
"Erasmus referred to his composition not by the title
common in modern scholarship, De libero arbitrio^ but simply
and significantly as Diatribe.."* Diatribe does not just
mean a discourse, discussion or conversation. The genre
Erasmus used developed in classical antiquity. "The most
evident formal characteristic of the 'diatribe' was debate
with a fictional interlocutor, one whose personality was
often imprecise, merely a mouthpiece for the popular opinion
the master was condemning."" He imitated the Academic
method which argues both sides of an issue, suspending
judgment and then summarizes in favor of the most probable
opinion .
He deliberated the arguments of the various
schools, balancing the extremes for "a moderation
of opinion." He calculated that mean to coincide
with Augustine's moderate theory, and he thus
declared it the sufficiently probable opinion.
This calculation of probability was no evasion of
the truth, as Luther would charge, but rather the
kind of decision Erasmus considered appropriate in
* E. Gordon Rupp, Translator and Editor, Luther and
Erasmus; Free will and Salvation. Volume XVII The Library of
Christian Classics (Philadelphia; The Westminster Press,
1969), 10.
* Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle, Rhetoric and Reform, (Cam
bridge, Massachusetts; Harvard University Press, 1983), 6.
" Ibid.
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disputed questions."
One of Luther's objections was that "he did not expli
cate the parts of the alleged definition."" Erasmus had
used comparisons to define himself. Erasmus' reply was that
he wrote for simple people and believed he had explained
himself sufficiently. Understanding is aided as the dis
pute progresses. This was a Socratic premise which "induc
tively enlarged, clarified, and even altered in the very
process of that comparison."*' This method of amplification
by comparison
constantly moves toward something more impressive.
It obtained its effect from this divergence from
its lesser start ing-point .. .Although explicit
reference to grace was absent from his initial
sentence, Erasmus both introduced and deliberated
it as the disputation progressed."
The use of this method caused Luther to remark, "you so
plead this case as to prevent me from becoming inflamed
against you . "*'
The use of arbitrium in the title is also a problem.
Erasmus defines liberum arbitrium as . . . "a power
of the human will by which a man can apply himself
to the things which lead to eternal salvation or
turn away from them." Here .arbitrium cannot be
** Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle, "Erasmus and the 'Modern'
Question: Was He Semi-Pelagian?" Archiv Fur Reformations
aeschichte. No. 75 (1984): 76.
" Ibid., 65.
" Ibid., 66.
" Ibid., 71.
Boyle, Rhetoric and Reform, 7.
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equated with voluntas, and it has been decided to
sacrifice tradition and a certain measure of
euphony on the altar of accuracy, and to translate
arbitrium throughout by "choice." The phrase
servum arbitrium is of course taken from Augus
tine, Contra lulianum II.viii.23, which is quoted
by Luther himself (p. 174, and n. 13) in the great
argument which forms the very core of his trea
tise."
The writing styles of the two men were also very dif
ferent. "Erasmus was steeped in classical Latin, and his
prose has an easy, sometimes even a free-and-easy, Cicero
nian quality that contrasts with the occasionally cryptic
syntax of Luther."" Luther's style was as "a daring,
subtle, passionate logician in the medieval manner, for his
advanced thinking; Erasmus a cool, dexterous logical fencer
but not committed so deeply.""
Johann (Johan) Huizinga, in his study of Eras
mus and the age of the Reformation, deals with the
controversy between Erasmus and Luther by noting
that Erasmus remains an observer of the events
taking place and deplores the tragedy of the
commotion, while Luther deliberately enters into
the whirl of events. Erasmus's use of words is
serenely objective, while Luther's is wildly
ecstatic, the language of a man trying to say
something that cannot be expressed in words.**
The tone of Erasmus is of accord and harmony and does
not seek discord, but Luther's reply is boisterous and
*' Rupp, Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation,
29 .
*' Ibid.
*� Ibid., 30.
** Aarne Siirala, Divine Humanness, translated by T. A.
Kantonen, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), 92.
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uses violent language. "Luther's language, unbridled and
careless from the standpoint of both theological and philo
sophical tradition, has often been regarded as simply the
expression of his temperament.""
In spite of its animosity the debate was con
ducted on a high level. One can feel Luther's
pleasure in crossing swords for once with an
opponent of the highest calibre, instead of the
petty, yapping critics for whom he needed only a
rough cudgel, and who now bored him so much that
as a rule he no longer answered them. He employed
the forms of ancient rhetoric and scholastic
disputation, showing once again that he had learnt
not a little from them; he made use of the terse
questions and answers that can be framed so effec
tively in Latin. But the lava kept bursting
through this outer covering; Paracelsus, a contem
porary with similar temperament, put it epigram-
matically; to put one's faith in the papacy is to
recline on velvet, to believe in Luther is to sit
on a volcano."
Frantz Funck-Brentano calls Pe Se^VQ A?;bUj;iQ "a
remarkable book that thrills the reader by its fiery elo
quence. The irresistible force of conviction and the flame
of enthusiasm that animates Luther illuminate his style, and
make it a volcano belching streams of molten lava.""
The Metaphors of the Debate
Luther received the treatise of his antag
onist with disgust and contempt. In writing his
reply, however, he suppressed these feelings out
wardly and observed the rules of courtesy. But
" Ibid., 93.
" Friedenthal, op. cit., 454-455.
" Frantz Funck-Brentano, Luther , translated by E. F.
Buckley, (London: Academy Books, 1939), 181.
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his inward anger is revealed in the contents
itself of De Servo Arbitrio (On the Will Not
Free ) . For here he really did what Erasmus had
just reproached him with�trying to heal a dis
located member by tugging at it in the opposite
direction. More fiercely than ever before, his
formidable boorish mind drew the startling
inferences of his burning faith. Without any
reserve he now accepted all the extremes of abso
lute determinism. In order to confute indeter-
minism in explicit terms, he was now forced to
have recourse to those primitive metaphors of
exalted faith striving to express the inexpres
sible: God's two wills, which do not coincide,
God's "eternal hatred of mankind, a hatred not
only on account of demerits and the works of free
will, but a hatred that existed even before the
world was created," and the metaphor of the human
will, which, as a riding beast, stands in the
middle between God and the devil and which is
mounted by one or the other without being able to
move towards wither of the two contending riders.
If anywhere, Luther's doctrine in De Servo Arbi
trio means a recrudescence of faith and a strain
ing of religious conceptions."
The metaphor of the beast and its rider was not an
invention of Luther. "There was a long tradition of its
use. Only, as McSorley points out, Luther breaks with the
tradition in that he equates the beast simply with the will
(not free will), makes the riders God and Satan instead of
sin and grace, and gives the beast no option as to which
rider it shall have.""
James Packer concludes that this metaphor does not
imply dualism, but
Luther is emphatic that the God with whom Satan
" Johan Huizinga, Erasmus and the Age of Reformation,
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), 163.
** Philip Watson, "Erasmus, Luther, and Aquinas."
(['(I^pcordi a Theological Monthly 40 (December, 1969 ): 752.
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fights as an enemy Himself works in Satan accord
ing to Satan's nature. Satan is God's tool as
well as His foe, and when it is His pleasure to
translate a man from Satan's kingdom to that of
His Son, Satan cannot prevent His doing so. In
this connection Luther makes much of Christ's
picture of the strong man's goods being despoiled
by the stronger man. No element of contingency or
uncertainty attaches to the outcome of God's
conflict with Satan; God reigns, and at every
point His will is done. Luther expresses this
thought elsewhere by affirming that God is the one
Being whose will is, in a completely unqualified
sense, free, inasmuch as His purposes cannot in
principle be thwarted.'*
Why a Debate?
"The quarrel between Erasmus and Luther is in reality
another phase of the controversy that once ranged round the
problem of Free Will and Grace.""
How are we to understand the conflict between
Erasmus and Luther? Is it a matter of tempera
ment? Is it a case of the cool (though somewhat
test) philosophical mind over against the rabity
of the dogmatic theologian? or the rational,
ethical concern of the moralist over against the
profound intuitions of a passionately religious
spirit? Such suggestions have often been made,
but they are at best superficial, for Erasmus is
by no means irreligious, and Luther is neither an
immoralist nor irrational. The two men represent
rather two different theological and ethical out
looks, two alternative ways of "thinking together"
God and man.
The nature of this difference does not emerge
so clearly as could be desired in the two works
before us, and that for two main reasons.
To begin with the Diatr ibe represents a rather
one-sided reaction on the part of Erasmus to
** James I. Packer, "Luther Against Erasmus." Concordia
Thpoloaical Monthly 37 (April, 1966): 218.
" Robert H. Murray Erasmus & Luther: Their Attitude
to Toleration, (London: Society for Promoting Christian
Knowledge, 1920), 217.
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Luther's position in his Assertio . . . "free choice
is in reality a fiction, or a name without real
ity." For no one has in it his power to think a
good or bad thought, but everything, . .happens by
absolute necessity."
In Erasmus' response to Luther's position in his Asser-
tio., Erasmus concentrated on Luther's statement that "every
thing happens by absolute necessity."" He does not come to
terms with Luther's essential concern of matters pertaining
to eternal salvation. Luther mentions this as the cardinal
issue between them and "the point on which everything in
this controversy turns."" However, instead of clarifying
his own position, Luther puts his reply in a point by point
answer "instead of giving a systematic clarification of his
own pos it ion .
" "
R. H. Murray contrasts Erasmus and Luther as the choice
between revolution or reform. Erasmus did not hold to new
doctrines being advanced nor new methods.
Erasmus could not become a follower of Luther, and
Luther would tolerate none but followers. Erasmus
had prepared the way for the new Messiah, only to
find that there was no longer a place for John the
Baptist. In fact, Luther had come to the stage
when the paths decisively diverged, the one head
ing to evolution and the other to revolution. The
choice lay between reform and revolution, and
Luther chose revolution. Humanism in his eyes
blocked the road to spiritual freedom. The cause
" Rupp, Luther and Erasmus; Free Will and Salvation^
12-13 .
" Ibid., 13.
" Ibid.
" Ibid.
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of Erasmus was suffering desertion from its ranks,
a plain proof that God was not with him."
Luther did not consider Erasmus as a theologian.
He had completely failed to grasp Luther's new
Gottesbegrif f and the distinction in the "New
Theology" between justification and sanctifica-
tion. Erasmus in his thinking still accepted the
medieval theology of meritum de congruo and
meritum de condigno, believing that man by the
efforts of his will achieved those changes in his
life which finally made him worthy of God's saving
grace. Erasmus followed the concept of man's
whole life as a continuing struggle to earn enough
merit to render himself finally worthy of God's
salvation. This view Luther had already rejected
by 1514 on the basis of Romans. Luther divided
mankind into two groups: those who had never
heard of God's mercy and saving grace and those
who had a knowledge of God and His plan of salva
tion. In speaking of the slavery of the human
will, Luther referred to the "natural man" before
conversion who knows nothing of sin or of Christ's
suffering and death on the Cross for him."
Differences Between Erasmus and Luther
Erasmus was Luther's senior by seventeen years.
The difference of generations is important. He
was coming into his own as the first scholar in
Christendom at a time when Luther was still an
unknown academic. For this European prestige and
for the physical means to carry on his studies,
Erasmus had to labour through long, anxious and
uncomfortable years."
" Murray, op. cit., 225.
" E. G. Schwiebert, Luther and his Times, (Saint
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950), 689. (Gottes-
begriff signifies the conception of God and His relationship
to sinful man) .
" Gordon Rupp, The Righteousness of God, (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1953), 260. (The seventeen years
difference in age is correct if the date of 1466 is accepted
for Erasmus' birth).
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Huizinga stresses their differences in personality and
nationality. "Erasmus, the man of the fine shades, for whom
ideas eternally blended into each other and interchanged,
called a Proteus by Luther; Luther the man of over-emphatic
expression about all matters. The Dutchman, who sees the
sea, was opposed to the German, who looks out on mountain
tops.""
Gordon Rupp describes Erasmus as "the original Flying
Dutchman, the last great wandering scholar of the Middle
Ages, and the first modern journalist, he moved from place
to place, fleeing from bad food as from the plague (he
departed from both with irritable haste)."" He also writes
that it "it would be superficial to write off Erasmus as the
Mr. Facing-Both-Ways of the Reformation.""
Erasmus and Luther represented two movements. Erasmus
as a humanist believed in education while Luther as a Refor
mer wanted to convert the masses. Preserved Smith contends
they fought
because they were so near together; because both
cultivated and both sought to dominate one sphere
of human interest, the spiritual-mental for which
we have no single word, but with the Germans call
geistig. But perhaps the compound English word
just used has its advantages, for it points out
the difference in the ideals of the two movements,
the one appealed primarily to the mental life
of art and thought, the other primarily to the
" Huizinga, op. cit., 164.
'* Rupp, The Righteousness of God^ 260.
" Ibid., 261.
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spiritual life of religion and morals."
Erasmus and Luther approached the issue of free will by
different methods. Erasmus followed Scholastic lines which
"presupposes the metaphysical dualism of ' nature '.. .and in
terms of which the relation between man and God, human
nature and divine grace, is construed. Luther, on the other
hand, takes much more seriously a quite different dualism,
namely that of God and the devil.""
Luther was penetrated through and through with a
sense of sin, of man's utter weakness and perdi
tion, as well as with the Divine justice, omni
potence, and grace. Therefore he attributed
everything to God, nothing to man. Erasmus was a
lover of Origen and of the Greek theologians, and
believed both in the omnipotence of God and in the
freedom of man, and that the Fall had not left man
a massa perdi t i onis ."
One significant difference between Erasmus and Luther
was their conversion experiences.
The conversion of 1505 which propelled Luther into
his vow "to become a monk": graphically illus
trates the "violent tenor" of the conversion
experience. The lightening bolt which struck
Luther to the ground on that occasion symbolizes
the instantaneous nature of conversion-grace,
which needs no previous "preparation" and which
caused Luther to break utterly with his former
plans and way of life. The second conversion, the
discovery of "the Gospel," was a dramatically
reorienting insight, which also led to a sharp and
" Smith, op. cit., 322.
" Watson, op. cit., 748-749.
" Faulkner, op. cit., 170.
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irreversible break with the past."
There is no evidence of Erasmus having such a conversion.
For Erasmus "salvation is understood as the restoration of
something lost rather than as the total transformation of
the whole person..."" Luther's salvation is radical which
is compared to birth. Cooperation is not necessary in one's
own birth in contrast to Erasmus believing a person does
something which merits God's grace.
Reactions to the Debate
After Erasmus published his book, "he regained his
popularity and even increased it. Some of this was due to
the fact that Luther did not immediately reply, thus exiting
in some the hope that the work of Erasmus was unanswer
able."*' Even though there were "theological shortcomings,
Erasmus' work was hailed with rejoicing by Luther's oppon
ents. They felt sure their hero had laid the heretic
low."*'
Melanchthon replied to Erasmus, "It has been well
*� John W. O'Malley, "Erasmus and Luther, Continuity
and Discontinuity as Key to their Conflict." Sixteenth
Century Journal. V. 2, (October, 1974): 59.
** Charles E. Hambr ick-Stowe , "Where is the Middle Way?
A Study of the Luther-Erasmus Free Choice Debate." Lutheran
Quarterly 29 (February 1977): 54.
** Mangan, op. cit., 246.
*' Schwiebert, op. cit., 690.
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received here, and it would be a tyranny to prevent any
one from expressing in the Church the sentiments which he
holds on religion. Such expression should be quite free to
all, provided that they do not mingle therein in human
motives . "**
Thomas More and Lord Mountjoy rejoiced at Erasmus'
reply. There were some conservative Catholics and some of
the humanists who severed their ties with Erasmus. "Francis
Lambert, the French Reformer, had already written a book on
The Captive Will,"" which was directed to Erasmus, but did
not name him.
The Catholic Church eventually disproved of Erasmus.
"For centuries Erasmus has been a man without a church."**
Kenneth R. Davis, however, finds that there are numerous
ideological parallels between Erasmus and the Anabaptists.
From De Libero Arbitrio, there are similarities in anthropo
logy and soteriology. Both see "the fall as primarily a
total fall of the flesh which encompasses the soul, but not
a total fall of the soul and spirit per se (i.e., of the
'directive faculty' [reason]). Right reason is warped and
** Mangan, op. cit., 251.
** Smith, op. cit., 353.
** Lowell C. Green, "Erasmus, Luther, and Melanchthon
on the Magnus Consensus: The Problem of the Old and the New
in the Reformation and Today." The Lutheran Quarterly 27
(November, 1975): 372.
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'obscured' by sin but 'not extinguished'."*' Davis also
finds an emphasis on repentance in Erasmus and the Anabap
tists. Faith is not just a "calculated faith," but one of
"heart" which "results in more than a forensic imputation
of righteousness; it must also produce active discipleship
including willing obedience, mortification of the flesh, the
triumph of the spiritual, and perseverance in the path to
perfection which includes being 'crucified to this
world'."** Both agree that grace through the agency of the
Holy Spirit is the help by which man attains his salvation.
Through the Holy Spirit "there is an internalization and
spir itualization of values, and the word, or 'divine wis
dom, ' the 'inner penetration' of which produces holy
life."** Man must cooperate with the Spirit "in this syner
gistic counteraction of evil and progress in sancti f icat ion
include obedience to knowledge (especially from Scripture,
prayer, works of piety), a mildly ascetic mortification,
self-examination and striving."** Erasmus and the Anabap
tists' view regarding violence is also similar.
George Faludy writes that Erasmus' view of free will
*' Kenneth R. Davis, "Erasmus as a Progenitor of Ana
baptist Theology and Piety," The Mennonite Quarterly Review
47 (July, 1973): 164-165.
*� Ibid., 167.
** Ibid., 169.
�� Ibid.
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had progressed after several years. This is evidenced in
J^is Hvperafspistes in which "he realized by now that the
fight concerned an issue which could never be resolved, and
he knew as well that his enemy would never grasp this
fact . ""
Luther considered De Servo Arbitrio as his "greatest
piece of theological writing."" B. B. Warfield considers
it a "dialectic and polemic masterpiece"" and E. Gordon
Rupp describes it "as the finest and most powerful Soli Deo
Gloria to be sung in the whole period of the Reformation."**
In contrast he appraises De Libero Arbitrio as exhibiting
"much learning but little insight."*'
Luther absorbed himself in rabid hatred for Erasmus.
Frantz Funck-Brentano theorized that Luther had lost "the
refuge in which his soul had at last found peace."" Luther
"describes Erasmus as a Judas... The friendly, or at least
peaceful, relationship which had existed between the human
ist and the reformer had come to an end. Luther and Erasmus
'* George Faludy, Erasmus of Rotterdam^ (London: Eyre
and Spottiswoode, 1970), 207.
"J. I. Packer and 0. R. Johnston, Martin Luther on
The Bondage of the Will^ (Westwood, New Jersey: Fleming H.
Revell Company, 1957), 40.
" Ibid., 40-41.
'* Ibid., 41.
'� Ibid.
'* Funck-Brentano, op. cit., 184.
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would no longer be seen as defenders of the same cause.""
The Bondage of the Will "was later to become a chief
source of Calvin's doctrine of predestination."*'
At the Lutheran Confession in 1943, the problem of
irresistible grace was discussed. The Formula Concordia
tried
to decide this question which had caused contro
versies after Luther's lifetime. It says that man
is at least able to say "No" if God calls him, he
is for a short moment given back his free will to
decide whether he wants to resist or not. We
might perhaps say: it is not in our power whether
the sun shines or not, but we may open the window
when it shines, or on the other hand, we may draw
the curtain and shut it out.**
*' Daniel Preus, "Luther
Humanism and the Reformation
terlv 46 (April-July, 1982):
*� Ibid., 206.
and Erasmus: Scholastic
" Concordia Theological Quar-
222.
�* H. H. Kramm, The Theology of Martin Luther^ (London:
James Clarke and Company, 1947), 40.
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CHAPTER 5
Theological Implications
Authority
"The thorniest problem of the Reformation is that of
authority."* Aristotle believed in the consensus of honest
inquirers. Judeo-Chr ist ian belief is that truth comes from
God and the New Testament contains personal encounters with
Christ. "A very significant difference between this Hebraic
and the Hellenic view of the source of truth is that the
revelation is not given to all men equally-"' Christ had
been seen only by some and later became a stumbling block to
the Jew.
Nevertheless in Christian thought the principle
of consensus has been combined with the concept of
revelation, not the consent of all men, but of
illumined men, the babes to whom the wisdom has
been given which is denied to the wise and under
standing. The combination of the two approaches
came about after Christian revelation had received
a certain codification by reduction to writing in
* John C. Olin, James D. Smart, and Robert E. McNally,
editors, Luther. Erasmus and the Reformation^ Roland H.
Bainton, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1969), 14.
' Ibid., 16.
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those books which were to form the New Testament.'
Aarne Siirala traces Erasmus' concept of authority to
the "idealistic, Platonic-Aristotelian tradition. Man is
seen as a subject encountering an objective reality. . .Man
becomes truly human and finds the divine reality of freedom
through participation in the world of ideals."* Erasmus'
concept of the student-teacher is that "man learns to know
God and himself through learning to know nature .. .Through
learning to think of reality in its rational terms, man
gradually becomes more and more human and free."' As man
participates in the world of ideals, he moves closer to the
divine and also "moves toward higher and higher values. The
hierarchy of values thus determines the relationship between
the divine and the human beings. The more one participates
in the world of values, the more authority and freedom one
has . "'
Erasmus considered knowledge to be the basic virtue.
He tried
to create a synthesis between the divine authority
of the Scriptures and the authority of human
reason. On the one hand, he proclaims that he is
unable to understand the divine revelation given
in the Scriptures, and therefore he says he is
ready to accept the authority of the Church as the
' Ibid.
* Aarne Siirala, "Authority in Erasmus and Luther."
pialoaue 7 (Spring, 1968): 110.
� Ibid.
* Ibid.
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interpreter of the divine will. On the other
hand, he tries to be faithful to the basic prin
ciples of idealistic humanism: only such truths
should have authority which can be proved by
experience to have universal validity. In trying
to find a synthesis between these two elements,
Erasmus was compelled to say that the Scripture
does not give ideals and ideas with such clarity
and verity that reason could test them by experi
ence and show them to be universally valid. Eras
mus had to claim, therefore, that since the Scrip
ture is unclear, it is in need of an authority to
interpret it.'
There was a wide spectrum of opinion. Sylvester
Prierias, who was commissioned by the Pope to counter Luther
said, "'whoever does not accept the doctrine of the Roman
Church and of the Roman pontiff as the infallible rule of
faith from which sacred Scripture derives strength and auth
ority is a heretic.'"* However, Luther saw the doctrine of
papal infallibility in opposition to consensus. "To make of
one man the sole interpreter of Scripture is the very pin
nacle of individualism."* However, Luther contended that
God revealed Himself to the minority. One must have the
Holy Spirit to understand the Scripture. However, Luther
discovered that Carlstadt and Zwingli interpreted the Scrip
ture differently regarding the physical presence of Christ
in the mass. Thomas Muntzer declared that he was a prophet
and "that truth is derived from direct, inner, personal
' Ibid., 112.
' Olin, Smart and McNally, op. cit., 17.
� Ibid.
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religious experience."" Luther's response was that
Christianity dates from a unique event, the self-
disclosure of God in Jesus Christ. If the Spirit
speaks today just as plainly, with as much author
ity, just as profoundly as in the days of Christ
and the apostles, then Christianity ceases to be
rooted in history. In that case it is no longer
Christianity, for it cannot retain its character
if turned into a merely contemporary cult by
visions of fanatics or the individualism of popes,
who, just as much as the fanatics, pretend to a
monopoly on the Holy Ghost."
Friedenthal contrasts Erasmus and Luther. Luther wrote
on the basis of "his own immediate experience, whereas Eras
mus took his stand on authorities in whom he himself
believed only to a limited extent, if at all."*'
Both held different views of theology. "Erasmus wanted
to keep both interpretation and management in a low key.
Luther wanted the theology to be played loud."*' Luther
wanted Scripture and teaching to be seen as the truth to
which man owed his total commitment. He saw the Word as
being self-operative and there was no need for the organiza
tion of the papacy. "For Erasmus, theology was a rather
tiresome professional necessity, tending towards blurring of
fact, and often a threat to genuine scholarship, simple
" Ibid., 22.
** Ibid., 22-23.
*' Richard Friedenthal, Luther his Life and Times^
translated by John Nowell, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovano-
vich. Inc., 1970), 454.
*' John M. Todd, Luther a Life^ (New York: Crossroad,
1982), 278.
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piety and good morals.""
god's Revelation
Erasmus challenged Luther regarding miracles. "The
apostles were believed only because they did miracles.""
In the sixteenth century miracles were believed readily, but
none of men whose new teachings had even cured a lame horse.
One side Luther was saying that God was active in
the world by means of the Word. But on the other
hand he denied miracles, and certainly never
claimed to do any... If Luther had changed a little
water into wine, even the Pope might have been
converted ... The point is that Erasmus was telling
Luther that if the Christian religion was God's
most important gift to man, and if God was alive
and active among men, surely He would not let that
faith be changed as Luther wanted it changed with
out giving some unmistakable sign that Luther was
God's prophet.**
"Erasmus repeated the old and well-worn argument that
Luther assumed a great deal to claim to know more than the
Greek and Latin Fathers and that it was difficult to believe
that for 1,300 years the Holy Ghost had permitted error to
be taught on the doctrine in question."*'
*? Ibid.
** Richard Marius, Luther a Biography^ (Philadelphia
and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1974), 181.
** Ibid., 182.
*' E. G. Schwiebert, Luther and his Times, (Saint
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950), 688-689.
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The Clarity nf i-he Scriptures
Erasmus had said that the Scripture was unclear and
that the Scripture seemed to contradict itself. Luther's
reply was "that the Scripture was its own interpreter.""
For Luther the whole Bible was inspired by God as His mes
sage to man and God cannot contradict Himself. "His view
that Scripture was its own interpreter allowed him to sim
plify the approach to the Bible and to declare an indepen
dence from ecclesiastical tradition.""
However, theologians many times disagree on the inter
pretation. "Whatever men read in the Bible they distort
into an assertion of their own opinion, just as lovers
incessantly imagine that they see the object of their love
wherever they turn."" The battles continue when both sides
appeal to the Scripture and back their thoughts on good
arguments. Preserved Smith agrees with Erasmus, for some
differences there will be no solution until the Last Judg
ment .
If they appeal to the guidance of the Spirit, what
proof do they offer that they are under infallible
inspiration? If you appeal to miracles, they talk
as if there had been no Christianity for thirteen
hundred years. If you ask for a good life, they
*� Marius, op. cit., 186
" Ibid., 186-187.
" Preserved Smith, Erasmus A Study of his Life, Ideals
a^d Place in History, (New York: Harper & Brothers, Pub
lishers, 1923), 347.
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claim to be justified by faith, not works.**
H. H. Kramm explains the passages of 1 Timothy 2:4 and
Matthew 13:11-15 seem to conflict regarding those who will
be saved. Kramm writes that neither Luther nor his fol
lowers tried
to reconcile apparent contradictions in the Bible.
They take both sides as they stand without trying
to smooth over the cleavage. This principle
applied to our present problem causes Luther to
make a distinction: there is God as revealed to
us, the Deus revelatus, God who wants to invite
all mankind to be saved. But there is a riddle in
God, the Deus absconditus (hidden God), who
causes, or at least permits, many human beings to
be lost for ever. It is the preacher's task to
preach the Deus revelatus and to offer salvation
to everyone; it is not his task to preach the Deus
absconditus. We cannot understand the latter, but
we know He exits.**
Erasmus emphasized consensus and tradition. He real
ized that the great truths can be known to all genuine seek
ers .
Any interpretation of a text which pretends to
expose a vital religious truth can be tested
against the testimony of the ages. To stand alone
against the continuity of that testimony is to run
the risk of ignoring obvious evidence or of fall
ing into irrelevant subtlety. Concord and consen
sus are correlative terms. Truth's peaceful bond
stretched back through time and across through
space to all men of good will.**
** Ibid.
** H. H, Kramm, The Theology of Martin Luther, (London:
James Clarke & Co., 1947), 41.
** John W. O'Malley, "Erasmus and Luther, Continuity
and Discontinuity as Key to their Conflict." Sixteenth
r.pnturv Journal V.2 (October, 1974): 51.
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The Eff<>ct of Predestination
The doctrine of predestination in all its
uncompromising cruelty! It crops up again among
the Jansenits. The Supreme Being knows, foresees
the future. The man whom God knows beforehand
will be damned, cannot therefore, whatever he does
or says, escape his fate... This line of reasoning
forced Luther to confess that according to his
doctrine Judas could not help betraying Christ.**
Erasmus believed the promise of reward or punishment
kept people in line. "By making the issue of the freedom of
the will a subject of popular debate, Luther, so Erasmus
believed, was stirring up boundless trouble."" Marius
asserts that Erasmus underestimated the power of predestina
tion to compel morality. Marius maintains that such a radi
cal movement as Luther began would not always remain radi
cal. The movement became institutionalized and became
so conservative that its impact on the world would
never be riotous. It would, rather become one of
pervasive and stifling dullness, and the creativ
ity of the movement would come only from the
explosive relief of those who escaped its suffoca
ting hold."
"The fundamental basis of Luther's teaching was that
God knows all things and has predestined all things.""
Those who are lost are lost because they are not conforming
" Frantz Funck-Brentano, Luther, translated by E. F.
Buckley, (London: Academy Books, 1939), 180.
" Marius, op. cit., 183.
*� Ibid., 184.
*' John Joseph Mangan, Life Character and Influence of
n�^.c,iderius Erasmus of Rotterdam. Volume Two, (New York:
MacMillan Company, 1927), 252.
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to His predestination.
At the end of his life Luther told how he tried to
console a woman in distress who was suffering from
this terrible form of Anfechtung, the temptation
about predestination. As Staupitz had turned him
so now he turned her thoughts to the one healing
remedy. "Hear the Incarnate Son, He freely offers
thee himself as Predestination."'*
One of the Scriptures that Erasmus had used to demon
strate free will was Joshua 24:15 with the theme, "choose
this day." Erasmus explained that the word "choose" assumes
that God's help was required. In contrast, "Luther made the
will of man entirely passive in the matter of salvation and
damnation, leaving him subject to the fixed laws of neces
sity.""
Determinism and Necessity
Luther touches an ancient and intricate medieval
debate, whether God foreknows contingent future
happenings, and if he does, whether they must take
place, simply because God foreknows them. The
elaborate distinction had been suggested between
"necessity of the consequence" and "consequential
necessity" that is between a necessity in the
natural and logical sequence of events, and a
necessity caused by the divine will. In this
debate the philosophers of the Middle Ages tended
to emphasize the reality of contingency, leaving
others to explain how God could have a knowledge
of contingent things if they were really and truly
contingent. The theologians reproached the philo
sophers with underrating the reality of the divine
prescience and the undermining the divine prophec
ies of Scripture. Luther is on the side and trad
ition of the theologians, but he will have nothing
*� Gordon Rupp, The Righteousness of God. (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1953), 283.
2t Mangan, loc. cit.
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to do with these elaborate distinctions. They
only wrap up the real question which is whether,
whatever may seem to us to be the truth, God
really holds the final, all-powerful, all-seeing
guardianship and control of his creation."
Luther has been considered a determinist. In contrast,
Carlstadt "maintained that the will is free only to sin.
This was moderate compared with the opinion of Wycliffe, or
Luther himself, who denied the existence of free will alto
gether."" According to Luther "God works all, man nothing.
God does not first create the evil in us, it is born there;
but after it is there, God works it out.""
Luther finds in the universe a divine determinism:
the panorama of human life unfolding according to
a divine pattern. The God of heaven and earth is
not the "stern judge sitting on a rainbow" of the
Erfurt days, but a kind heavenly Father guiding
our footsteps in love and in wisdom seeking the
salvation of our souls, but punishing those who
deliberately and knowingly reject His saving
grace .
Luther explained to Erasmus the difference
between necessitas and its opposite, coactio, the
distinction between "necessity" and "force."
Judas was not forced to betray Christ, but his act
was necessary in the eternal unfolding of the plan
of redemption. Here God's foreknowledge had seen
what Judas would do, and prophecy could predict
the later divine necessity. Man is not forced by
God to act a certain way, but as he chooses to act
according to his normal inclinations, he fulfills
God's ultimate purposes."
" Rupp, The Righteousness of God, 279.
" George Faludy, Erasmus of Rotterdam, (London: Eyre &
Spottiswoode, 1970), 204.
" John Alfred Faulkner, Erasmus: The Scholar. (Cinci
nnati: Jennings and Graham, 1907), 175.
" Schwiebert, op. cit., 693.
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Luther believed that God "at times made use of evil,
even of Satan himself"" in order to fulfill His ultimate
good .
On the basis of this divine revelation, Luther
believed that man before his conversion was a
slave to sin and not a free agent. Without the
light of God, how could he find his way to the
Cross? He was still in the kingdom of darkness,
ruled only by God's omnipotence. After his con
version he was in the Kingdom of Grace, ruled by
the Holy Spirit. To pagans God could only be a
God of force; to Christians He became a God of
love, as revealed through Jesus Christ. For the
redeemed, God's ultimate power was a great comfort
and consolation for He had promised that even the
gates of hell should not prevail against them."
Luther uses the Scripture and Augustine to defend his
thesis, but "he adds a new argument that comes neither from
Scripture nor August ine--nor anywhere in the Christian trad
ition... that the will is not free because all things happen
by absolute necessity."** This gives a new meaning to his
doctrine of servum arbitrium. His original understanding
was that man was not free because of his bondage to sin, but
"now becomes a doctrine which imposes absolute necessity and
excludes free will by the very fact that we are creatures,
not because we are sinners."*' Also Luther cited "Virgil, a
fatalistic pagan poet, to support his thesis of absolute
** Ibid., 694.
" Ibid.
'* Jared Wicks, ed. Catholic Scholars Dialogue with
Luther , (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1970), 109.
*' Ibid., 110.
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necessity is an a priori indication that this concept of
servum arbitrium is neither strictly biblical nor Chris
tian.""
Searching for any argument he can find to support
the bibl ical-August inian doctrine of fallen man's
bondage to sin, he finds one that is both unneces
sary and unfortunate--tvo constitutive elements of
all tragedy. . .The use of the necessitarian argu
ment is likewise most unfortunate for it gives the
Catholics corroborating proof that he is truly a
heretic, a new representative of the old Mani-
chaean denial of free will."
The Implications of Discord
Luther was disrupting the peace of the Church. Luther
believed that he
was proclaiming the eternal truth of God. He
would not be silent. Erasmus, despite his commit
ment to open discussion, told Luther that, having
been condemned by the Church and the Empire, he
should subside. Another consideration also
entered here: Luther's continued agitation was
disrupting the peace of the Church and of
Christendom. Wars of religion were already
beginning. Let Luther be silent in the interests
of peace, and for the sake of that atmosphere in
which alone discussion can prove fruitful. When
tempers are so heated, silence is better than
violence of word or deed."
Luther insisted that revelation came from above while
Erasmus believed that truth could be worked out from below,
but needed a proper atmosphere. Roland Bainton concludes
" Ibid.
" Ibid.
" Olin, Smart, and McNally, op. cit., 24.
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that circumstances must be considered.
A man under attack may refrain from a reply rather
than set off a chain reaction of recriminations.
When men find themselves unable to carry on a
discussion in a reasonable manner, with readiness
on the part of each to listen to the other, they
do well to declare a moratorium until they have
achieved emotional control. If there is a mon
strous abuse it must be exposed and denounced, but
he who makes the exposure should refrain from
wanton provocation and should seek to restrain his
following from irresponsible violence of word and
deed."
Erasmus' aim was to elevate the level of controversy as
he hated contention of any kind.
He had always taught that Christians should not
quarrel viciously with each other over theological
issues. His attitude was taken to be cowardice
by Luther and by others, but Erasmus was no
coward. He was aware of how frail the bonds of
human society are and how disputes in which the
antagonists feel that they must win at any price
are most likely to end by destroying the society
itself. He was increasingly dismayed as the
Reformation developed into a contest in vitupera
tion. His own tractate was written with the sort
of wry dispassion he wished others would use in
religious discussion. He was convinced that the
alternative to such moderation was the permanent
rending of Christianity.**
Erasmus' pacifism "continues to survive .. almost in its
original form, and so do his tolerance and his belief that
man can be changed by education and led aright by reason."*'
The Reformation and the Renaissance related as
the smaller movement to the larger. Erasmus had
created the conditions which rendered the Lutheran
revolt possible. The liberals of the day, the
Ibid., 25.
Marius, op. cit., 184.
Faludy, op. cit., 262.
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humanists, were as stoutly opposed as Luther to
the reign of the scholastic authority and of
scholasticism. It proved impossible on this point
to reconcile Protestant humanism and Protestant
Lutheranism. The day for argument was going, if
not gone, for Erasmus was beginning to insist that
there are evils which can only be healed by fire
and sword. So thought the head of the writer, but
his heart shrank from it. Tragedy, according to
Hegel, is not conflict between right and wrong,
but the conflict between right and right.**
James Atkinson recognizes that historical facts are
inclined to be ugly, but they teach about man's failures.
If the Reformation went the way it did by tearing
Christendom in half, and then wracking the Pro
testant half with enthusiasm and liberalism, with
socialism and politics, with schism and sect, and
petrifying the Catholic half with its medievalism,
we must recall that man's costliest error has
always been to spurn fact and truth in his immedi
ate self-interest: men do not gather grapes of
thorns nor figs from thistles. If history is ever
to make us wise it is perhaps man's failures that
have to teach him most.*'
James I. Packer, however, considers that Erasmus pos
sessed an attitude of doctrinal indif ferentism. This
results in such statements as: "What matters is not what a
man believes but what he is and does... Do your best... and
God will certainly smile on you and help you and accept
you."** Packer maintains that doctrinal indif ferentism
** Robert H. Murray, Erasmus and Luther: Their
Attitude to Toleration, (London: Society for Promoting
Christian Knowledge, 1920), 226.
*' James Atkinson, The Trial of Luther, (New York:
Stein and Day, 1971), 196.
*' James I. Packer, "Luther Against Erasmus." Concordia
ThPoloaical Monthly 37 (April, 1966): 211.
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results from soter iological optimism which results in an
unconcern about the redemption which Christ offers and a
"confidence in the goodness of natural man."*'
Luther saw Erasmus as a man who believed in peace at
any price. Luther counters "to wish to silence these
tumults is nothing else than to wish to hinder the Word of
God and to take it out of the way."** Luther contends that
the Word changes and renews the world.
Is There a Middle Way?
Margaret Mann Phillips in her book Erasmus and the
Northern Renaissance, first published in 1949, regards Eras
mus as "the apostle of the 'Middle Way, ' faithful to his
original ideals, seeking and continuing to seek a spiritual
reform, but not the disruptive and intolerant reform of the
Protestants."** Phillips does not consider the "Middle Way"
as a position of indecision or weakness, but one which is
central in explaining Erasmus' character. His method of
reform could not be equated with Luther who protested
against the entire structure of the church. Erasmus main
tained that reform should come from holding the middle
ground. However, by holding the middle ground in the time
*' Ibid.
*� Rupp, The Righteousness of God, 273.
** John C. Olin, Six Essays on Erasmus, (New York:
Fordham University Press, 1979), 63.
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of polarization, "neither side could see him as its own, and
both extremes viewed him as faithless and disloyal.""
Deep within Erasmus' personality comes the explanation
for his seeming ambiguity or middle ground as "he looked at
the world with a certain detachment and with something of a
skeptical gaze."" He realized that hypocrisy and self-
deception abounded about him.
The Silenus figure whose outward appearance is
quite different from its inward reality had deep
attraction for him, and irony in one instance,
tolerance in another, were the qualities that came
most natural to him. This temper of mind or
disposition was reinforced by the kind and quality
of his religious faith, just as that faith itself
was influenced and formed by his natural inclina
tions. He saw charity as the great Christian
virtue and peace and unity among Christians as its
most cherished fruit. His "philosophy of Christ"
was a practical guide, and it would lead men
restored in Christ to the practice of charity and
the haven of peace. Assertion or dogmatism,
bitterness or hostility, party or strife were not
of its essence and indeed were antithetical to the
whole spirit and message of the Gospel. These
particular emphases of Erasmus' religious faith
conformed to the natural bent of his mind, and the
personal union thus effected contrived to dis
sociate him from all factionalism or fanaticism.
Erasmus, it was said even in his own day, was "for
himself," but in reality he stood, as he gazed out
upon the follies of the world, for the Gospel of
unity and peace. His moderation or middle ground
was rooted in large part in this equation. By the
same token it was difficult for men of other
tempers and other convictions to understand or
accept him."
�� Ibid., 60.
" Ibid.
" Ibid.
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Continuity anrl Discontinuity
John W. O'Malley proposes that the debate between
Erasmus and Luther was "a pattern of continuity in Erasmus
and a pattern of discontinuity in Luther."*' The pattern of
continuity can be described as God's continual presence in
His church. In the pattern of discontinuity, the church is
portrayed as having lost doctrinal truth.
To understand Erasmus' thought, it is necessary to
"begin with a description of the literary and rhetorical
tradition which he inherited from antiquity. This tradition
had been transmitted to the Middle Ages by Augustine and
notably revived by Petarch and other Renaissance humanists.
Erasmus was its most distinguished exponent in the sixteenth
century."** Erasmus depended upon his oratory skills.
Learning did not depend upon "tedious inquiry nor dogmatic
assertion but eloquent persuasion was the proper style of
the truly educated roan."** The orator would speak on the
great truths of life which were available to all. These
truths "are articulated in the great corpus of antique
literature, sacred and profane. Men may need to be reminded
of them, and they certainly need to be persuaded to living
** O'Malley, op. cit., 48.
�* Ibid.
*� Ibid., 49.
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according to them."" Erasmus believed that good language
skills were important to understand the truths, but "the
test of true theology was the ability to move others to the
good, and since lived religion and good example were the
most powerful persuasion,"*' the common person could be a
theologian. Erasmus placed emphasis on consensus and tradi
tion. If one stands "alone against the continuity of that
testimony is to run the risk of ignoring obvious evidence
or of falling into irrelevant subtlety. Concord and con
sensus are correlative terms. Truth's peaceful bond
stretched back through time and across through space to all
men of good will."** The central message of Christ's life
and words were peace and concord. Erasmus believed that
Christ came "to reconcile the world to the Father, to join
men by indissoluble bonds of charity, and to make man his
friend. ""
Another doctrine of Erasmus "is the abiding presence of
Christ and the Holy Spirit in the church to keep it from
substantial error."" He realized there was a breakdown
in morals and theological methods. He believed that the
*� Ibid.
*' Ibid., 51.
�� Ibid.
�� Ibid., 54.
�" Ibid., 55.
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institution of the church was not to be disturbed in its
essential structure. "The Holy Spirit had never deserted
the church in the past, and it had not deserted the church
in Erasmus' own day.""
Luther's sense of discontinuity can be traced to his
conversion and his discovery of the Gospel.
Although many of Luther's contemporaries like
Erasmus, fascinated by the Renaissance discovery
of anachronism, were applying the concomitant
discovery of historical discontinuity to the story
of the Church, they restricted this discontinuity
to the relatively save areas of morals, disciple,
and charismatic gifts. Luther's great and fright
ful insight was that the discontinuity extended to
doctrinal truth. What was true in his personal
doctrinal history was true also in the doctrinal
history of the Roman church: an irreversible and
uncompromising conversion from falsehood to the
truth was required before the church could vali
date its claim to ecclesiastical authenticity.
Between falsehood and truth there was only cleav
age, no middle ground.*'
The Scripture was the sole source of the Gospel and
therefore had to be the only source which the theologian
could use. "Theology was not to quest and question, as in
scholasticism, nor was it to persuade and transform, as in
Erasmus. It was to assert and proclaim."*'
The Nature of Man
Erasmus did not choose to attack Luther for his view of
*' Ibid., 56.
" Ibid., 61.
*' Ibid. , 62 .
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the Pope, vows, or the sacraments, but he "perceived the
fundamental issue in the Reformation was the nature of man.
Luther believed that man had no free will and that if anyone
was saved for heaven, it was because God elected him, gave
him faith freely, and granted him the power to persevere in
this life as a Christian."** Erasmus believed that man
should "live in a middle ground between presumption and
despair."** If one believed he were predestined to be save,
then good works may be abandoned. Likewise, what is the
purpose of good works if one is to be damned? Erasmus
preferred to remain a skeptic and suspend judgment.
Erasmus was very close to saying something that
the existentialists have said in various ways in
our own time. Since we are always conscious of
our freedom, we must act as if we were free. To
do anything else is to make human life something
very different in reality from what we experience
it to be. To assume that we are always bound to
kill the inner demand on men that they do their
duty and act responsibly. Whether we can fairly
call his position existentialist or not, we can
surely say in his view of predestination, Erasmus
was much like Ignatius of Loyola and John Wesley.
Far better to assume freedom and to leave God's
mystery to Himself.'*
Gordon Rupp considers Luther's motive was to safeguard
the Grace of God in order to attack man's self -righteous
ness . Luther believed for man to understand that salvation
is beyond his power, will or works, he must be humbled to be
'* Marius, op. cit., 180.
" Ibid.
" Ibid., 181.
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absolutely dependent upon the will, counsel and
pleasure of another. That man's repentance, his
conversion, his turning to God is a divine work;
that Faith itself is a miracle and a gift, the
work of the Holy Spirit; these are truths that
modern English and American Protestantism, some
times far more Pelagian and anthropocentr ic than
late medieval Nominalism, has good need to ponder.
Most of us feel that to deny "Free Will" as com
pletely as Luther is to cut the very root of the
meaning of human personality (but in the theolo
gical sense, are we persons because of innate
qualities or because we are treated by God as
responsible before him, even in our sins? Are we
not persons because of our standing coram Deo?)*''
Luther rejected humanism because instead of leading to
contemplation about God, it makes thinking divine.**
Erasmus' view of man "as only partially corrupted by
sin"*' is similar to Thomas Aquinas who was
unwilling to say that either God's grace or man's
merit is entirely responsible for man's salvation;
so he chooses an intermediate theory. God's grace
is said to be very active in the process, but it
must have reference to some sort of on the part of
man. Although he does not use Thomistic terminol
ogy, Erasmus seems to be distinguishing between
merit (meritum de condigno) and approximate merit
{meritum de congruo) , which is a distinction
commonly made by the Scholastics. Like Luther,
Erasmus agrees that genuine merit does not exist,
but he argues that God, in his boundless mercy,
treats the lesser merit as though it were the
greater. In effect, then, a man who does his
best on the level of the meritum de congruo is
given the gift of a special grace whereby he can
" Rupp, The Righteousness of God. 278.
** Aarne Siirala, Divine Humanness, translated by T. A.
Kantonen, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), 83.
*� Terrence M. Reynolds, "Was Erasmus Responsible for
Luther? A Study of the Relationship of the Two Reformers
and their Clash over the Question of the Will." Concordia
T^p>9logical Quarterly 41 (October, 1977): 25.
eventually achieve genuine merit.
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The Nature of nnc\
Erasmus believed "in a God desirous of man's salvation,
not his damnation; if we deny free will then damnation be
comes entirely the responsibility of God."" R. H. Murray
writes that Erasmus saw God as master and man as a slave.
However as slave, man also has a share of freedom and
responsibility. "Man is a pilot who thanks God for having
saved him from a tempest. Nevertheless, his own talent is
essential for the navigation of the ship.""
Luther's view of God was not that He is two Gods, but
has two wills, Deus absconditus and Deus revelatus . This
belief is expanded into the three layers of knowledge -"the
light of nature, the light of grace, and the light of
glory. ""
For Luther, Deus absconditus or a "hidden God" was only
faintly detected by man through his five senses.
What he determines on the basis of reason is
almost wholly wrong. Only by divine revelation
does the "hidden God" become the "revealed God," a
revelation which reached its peak in Jesus Christ.
Beyond this revelation a human being cannot know
God. According to this revelation, God is the
Ibid.
Faludy, op. cit., 205.
Murray, op. cit., 218.
Rupp, The Righteousness of God,. 283.
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only free, independent agent in the universe.'*
The roost stinging accusation against Luther's view is
that by denying
the freedom of the will, makes God the author of
sin, which is consistent with neither God's right
eousness nor goodness. The demands of God upon
man assume his freedom, otherwise God would be a
tyrant. Only on this assumption is there any
human responsibility. All God's commandments are
for the purpose of stimulating him to virtue. He
is to strive after perfection, and so he must
fight with sin. But that is all illusory if man
can only do what God drives him to do. If man is
free, it is not an illusion. And that freedom in
the religious sphere is simply this: the power to
receive or reject eternal salvation. Here grace
comes in, which is carefully guarded by Erasmus.
It is not merely a natural endowment of man from
God, but it is a transforming working power which
goes out from God into the will of man."
Luther's metaphor of the rider ridden by God or the
devil gives insight into his perception of God.
One trouble with Luther was his false psychology,
his false conception of the Divine immanence (for
God has not left Himself without a witness in the
soul, for He is there), of the Divine Fatherhood.
His famous picture of the soul, either as a rider
ridden by God to heaven or by the devil to hell,
is sufficient. But the profound religiousness of
his nature, to which God was all-in-all, was at
the bottom of his contention, and that made his
aim a noble one, even if in its execution he shows
that there were some things not dreamed of in his
philosophy- With Luther we can not assign too
much to God in man's salvation, but with Erasmus
we must maintain man's integrity as a moral per
sonality, who is to give an account of hiroself to
God . '�
'* Schwiebert, op. cit., 692-693.
" Faulkner, op. cit., 174.
'� Ibid., 177-178.
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Luther's understanding of God is that He is "absolutely
free and completely sovereign. . .What God wills is not right
because he ought, or was bound, so to will; on the contrary,
what takes place must be right because he so wills it.""
God is the Creator and man is not in the position to judge
God's activity. Men can only assume a stance of praise and
wonder before God.
The Effect on the Church
Now the Church had always regarded Augustine
as one of its greatest ornaments. He was one of
the "four Fathers" upon whom, as upon four pil
lars, rested its majestic structure. Yet in
practice, the Church had never lived up to the
doctrine of the enslaved will... So far as the
Church had ever formulated its views on the mat
ter, it had been "Semi -Pe lagian . " It recognized
in human justification both the grace of God and
the will of man, but did not draw with absolute
clearness a conclusion as to the preponderance of
one over the other. In fact the Church had done
something better than to speculate. It had acted.
It had evolved a marvelous system of justifying
agencies, administered by itself, and had said to
its members, in practice if not in theory, "Do
these things and you shall be saved." While this
excellent machinery worked, there was obviously no
occasion for any good Christian to worry about the
conditions of justification and in fact, from the
ninth to the fifteenth century, the Augustinian
doctrines are not once brought prominently before
the world for discussion. It was only when men
began once more to doubt whether the church method
of doing specific things and getting certificates
for them was, after all, the only way, or even the
best way, to find one's adjustment with God, that
this whole group of subjects began once more, to
" Robert D. Shofner, "Luther on The Bondage of the
Will : An Analytical-Critical Essay." Scottish Journal of
Theology 26 (February, 1973) :30.
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demand attention.'*
The implication to the church is the function of the
individual. Erasmus in the Enchiridion emphasized the "the
individual conscience in determining action."'* This can
lead to the belief that there is no ultimate appeal outside
of the individual. "Men claim individual inspiration, inner
illumination, when they oppose the Church.""
Cyprian said in the third century, "Outside the church
there is no salvation."** Rome's claim was based that the
church possessed the keys of eternal life.
The validity of the sacraments, the worth of the
Scriptures, the very virtues of Christ's atonement
were secured by the authority of the Pope, medi
ated to the people through the hierarchy. So long
as this conception was unquest ioningly held, the
Pope's power was absolute. Men might denounce
him, they might chafe at his tyranny, yet they
dared not oppose him who held the issues of their
eternal well-being in his hand. Unless this
conception were overthrown, such attacks on Rome
as we find in Luther's earlier treatises of 1520
could have but little effect. Multitudes had come
to a practical distrust of the Pope; and bore his
impositions in sullen silence or dead indif
ference; but the old dread of the priest still
lingered in the heart and held in check any open
revolt .*'
'� Ephraim Emerton, Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam,
(New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1899), 284-285.
'* Ibid., 286.
*� Murray, op. cit., 220.
�* George M. Boicourt, "Luther's Treatise On Christian
Freedom. " Methodist Review 104 (July, 1921): 567.
�* Ibid.
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Luther's doctrine of justification by faith "was a new
idea whose expulsive power was able to cast out the super
stition inherited from the centuries."" Cyrian's concept
of the church continued, "but the medieval conception of the
church as the empirical organization gave way to the modern-
-and ancient--concept ion of is as the 'number of the elect.'
Man's salvation depends, not upon the mediation of the
priest, but upon the immediate work of Jesus Christ.""
Salvation
Erasmus "standing in the semi-Pelagian Scholastic
tradition,"*' held that man was weakened by sin, but man by
"his own strength (ex puris naturalibus)"" was able to
dedicate himself to spiritual concerns. This enabled man to
be "a fit subject for the gift of internal grace. It did
not positively oblige God to give internal grace... it merely
removed the barrier ... i .e . man's unworthiness of it and his
unpreparedness . With God's grace, the fit subjects were
able to do works which were meritorious which would put God
" Ibid., 568.
Ibid.
*' J. I. Packer and 0. R. Johnston, Martin Luther on
Thp Bondage of the Will, (Westwood, New Jersey: Fleming H.
Revell Company, 1957), 48.
Ibid., 49.
*' Ibid.
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under an obligation. This theory is the Scholastic theory
which distinguishes "between 'congruent' merit (meritum de
congruo) and 'condign' merit (meritum de condigno) . "** The
purpose of this theory was to bring together "the reality of
God's freedom in giving salvation and, on the other, the
reality of man's merit in earning it: to show that God
really becomes man's debtor."**
Luther's thesis has two parts. The first is that
we are justified not on the ground of any merit of
our own (for we have none) but through God's own
gift of righteousness, freely bestowed on us in
virtue of the obedience and sacrifice of Christ
and received through faith alone. The second
part, often underemphasized today, is his equally
vigorous insistence that our very faith depends
not on any natural ability to trust God (again, we
have none) but on God's calling; that is His
supernatural woric by the Spirit of creating in us
a response to the word of the Gospel. God in
grace gives not only righteousness but also faith
to receive it.*'
John W. O'Malley writes that Luther discovered that few
were accepting the proclamation of the Gospel and "the
number of the saved was small."** Even though Luther had
found salvation in the Gospel, he found even Popes, bishops
and theologians were "rejecting the Gospel. Even more
*� Ibid., 48.
�� Ibid., 49.
*� Packer, Concordia Theological Monthly, 213.
�* O'Malley, op. cit., 60.
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scandalous, they were actually trying to suppress it...""
Luther became convinced that the Gospel was being blocked by
the policy of the papal church. The church had failed in
the proclamation of the Gospel. "The most vital and essen
tial ecclesiastical function, the proper preaching of the
word of God, had been interrupted for long ages and had even
suffered suppression."*'
" Ibid.
�' Ibid. 61.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
The basic question which arose in the debate: Does
salvation depend on grace, and can we obtain grace by our
own deeds? Erasmus states that we can obtain grace by our
own deeds. It is clear that Erasmus strayed from the Scrip
ture for his definition of free will, "the power of the
human will whereby man can apply to or turn away from that
which leads us unto eternal salvation."* Ephesians 2:8-9
states: "For it is by grace you have been saved, through
faith--and this not from yourselves, it is the gift of God--
not by works, so that no one can boast. "(NIV) Erasmus has
ignored the means of grace in this definition. He does,
however, mention the need for grace many times in his book,
but his error in his definition left him wide open for
attack by Martin Luther, a champion for grace.
In examining Erasmus' life, it is difficult to
* Ernst F. Winter, translator Erasmus -Luther - Dis-
^n^^rse on Free Will. (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing
Co., 1961), 20.
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determine how he was affected by his illegitimate birth. It
is apparent that the different versions of his life may be
from his own hand, but could have also been inventions of
others. He was highly respected and taking on Luther helped
him in some circles. He enjoyed a high position in the
church, but recognized its weaknesses. He believed in the
authority of the church, but failed to realize that the
modified form of Pelagianism ( "Semi-Pelagianism" ) was con
demned in 529. However, it is true that the church itself
was "Semi-Pelagian" as it sold indulgences which bought
mer i turn .
It is interesting that there is no record of a
conversion experience for Erasmus. Luther, on the other
hand, came face to face with himself in the Scripture. He
had already known he was lost, but realized he was not able
to change himself, "But I see another law at work in the
members of my body, waging war against the law of my mind
and making me a prisoner of the law of sin at work within my
members." (Rom. 7:23, NIV) Luther also discovered Rom.
3:23-24, "For all have sinned and fall short of the glory of
God, and are justified freely by his grace through the
redemption that came by Christ Jesus." (NIV) In answering
the basic question, salvation depends only on grace. This
is a doctrine which at times seems to get lost in Chris
tianity.
However, Luther denied the existence of free will and
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stated that all things happen by necessity. This implies
God as being a Judge. Perhaps Luther never found the
"peace of God which transcends all understanding..." (Phil.
4:7, NIV) which comes from the witness of the Spirit. "The
Spirit himself testifies with our spirit that we are God's
children." (Rom. 8 16, NIV) However, some of Luther's
turmoil can be attributed to a melancholy spirit which John
Wesley calls "heaviness."*
Luther fails in his definition of God. His God is
very narrow being defined in the dualistic sense of being
Revealed or Hidden. His idea of God is one Who is respon
sible for evil. By his following Augustine's teachings, he
believes in the "number of the elect" which implies predest
ination - those who are saved and those who are predestined
to be lost. However, the Lutheran Church today does not
adhere to his belief.
Examining the state of man, Luther "denies that man
has free will not because he is a sinner but because he is a
creature."* In contrast, Erasmus is too optimistic as he
believes man is only partially corrupted by sin. John Wes
ley sought the Scripture for a third alternative. He viewed
"sin as a malignant disease rather than an obliteration of
* John Wesley, Wesley's 52 Standard Sermons, pub. N.
Burwash (Salem, Ohio: Schmul Publishing Co., Inc., 1988,
480.
' Jared Wicks, ed . Catholic Scholars Dialogue with
Luther . (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1970), 115.
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the ^ imago Dei' in fallen nature"* and replaced the doctrine
of election with prevenient grace. God is active in calling
all to repentance. He does not just call "the elect." "Sin
is spoken of as a sickness that can be cured by the Great
Physician if we will accept his threefold prescription: (1)
repentance (self-knowledge), (2) renunciation of self-will,
and (3) faith (trust in God's sheer, unmerited grace)."*
Prevenient grace is not irresistible, but it causes mankind
to see its sinfulness. It allows men to recognize God and a
"self -recognition that identifies spiritual pride and self-
righteousness and rejects them both as inauthent ic . "*
Quoting from the Definitions , McSorley states that
the "enslaved will" is not a biblical term. However, sin
is bondage which results in self-deception, self-satisfac
tion, and rationalization. Qnly Jesus Christ can release
the sinner from the bondage of sin which leads to eternal
death. With Christ's blood, the sinner is justified and
through the power of the Holy Spirit, the Christian is lead
into sanctif ication. With Luther's view of man, man is
forever entrapped.
Justification by faith can be accused of taking
salvation and righteousness out of the church. This is
* Albert C. Outler, Theology in the Wesleyan Spirit,
(Nashville: Discipleship Resources), 34.
� Ibid., 37.
' Ibid., 38.
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true. God gives prevenient grace, and it does not neces
sarily always occur in the setting of the church. The
church can become an institution for man's ego, self-satis
faction, or a hiding place. However, God has ordained the
church to be His instrument. The sacraments are means of
grace which are solely administered by His church.
The debate between Erasmus and Luther has been called
tragic. It is tragic to see the body of Christ divided.
Perhaps neither Erasmus nor Luther are good examples of how
to disagree. Luther's temperament lead him to be caustic.
Erasmus' mildness could be considered doctrinal indifferent-
ism. Erasmus' view of man as a sinner is clearly seen as
he saw the conflict and the ruthlessness to which man goes
to prove his own point. Erasmus cannot be judged as ignor
ing problems as he defended Luther many times. His advice,
if one stands "alone against the continuity of that testi
mony is to run the risk of ignoring obvious evidence or of
falling into irrelevant subtlety'" is worth remembering
today.
The discord between Erasmus and Luther can be com
pared to Erasmus desiring consensus and Luther's belief
he was God's instrument in rediscovering justification by
faith which had been ignored by the "harlot" church. As
' John W. O'Malley, "Erasmus and Luther, Continuity and
Discontinuity as Key to their Conflict." Sixteenth Century
�Tnurnal V. 2 October, 1974): 51.
94
Christians, we should not have confidence in our goodness,
intellect, or ability, but the Scripture is our authority.
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